Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Criminal Sanctions and Deterrence

Living reference work entry

Latest version View entry history

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_19-3

Abstract

This entry defines criminal sanctions by distinguishing them from civil sanctions, and briefly surveys the major categories of criminal sanctions, both ancient and new. The entry then outlines the primary social justifications for using such sanctions—focusing on deterrence as a distinct purpose of punishment—and describes a basic model of criminal offending to highlight the conditions under which the threat of criminal sanctions can influence offender behavior in predictable ways. Next explored are the implications for deterrence of the different types of criminal sanctions. A brief discussion of the suggestive conclusions emerging from related empirical evidence follows.

Keywords

Deterrent Effect Criminal Sanction Potential Offender Public Enforcement Alternative Sanction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

References

  1. Becker GS (1968) Crime and punishment: an economic approach. J Polit Econ 76(2):169–217CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bierschbach RA, Stein A (2005) Overenforcement. Georgetown Law J 93:1743–1781Google Scholar
  3. Calabresi G, Douglas Melamed A (1972) Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: one view of the cathedral. Harv Law Rev 85:1089–1128CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Durlauf SN, Nagin DS (2011) The deterrent effect of imprisonment. In: Cook PJ, Ludwig J, McCrary J (eds) Controlling crime: strategies and tradeoffs. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 43–94Google Scholar
  5. Eide E (2000) Economics of criminal behavior. In: Boudewijn B, De Gerrit G (eds) Encyclopedia of law and economics, vol 5. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 345–389Google Scholar
  6. Freeman RB (1999) Chapter 52: The economics of crime. In: Ashenfelter O, Card D (eds) Handbook of labor economics, vol 3. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 3529–3571Google Scholar
  7. Kessler DP, Levitt SD (1999) Using sentence enhancements to distinguish between deterrence and incapacitation. J Law Econ 42(1):343–363CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Levitt SD, Miles TJ (2007) Chapter 7: Empirical study of criminal punishment. In: Polinsky AM, Shavell S (eds) Handbook of law and economics, vol 1. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 457–495Google Scholar
  9. Miceli T (2009) The economic approach to law, 2nd edn. Stanford Economics and Finance, StanfordGoogle Scholar
  10. Nagin DS (2013) “Deterrence in the twenty-first century”. Crime and justice. Crime Justice Am 1975–2025 42(1):199–263CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Piehl AM, Williams G (2011) Institutional requirements for effective imposition of fines. In: Cook PJ, Ludwig J, McCrary J (eds) Controlling crime: strategies and tradeoffs. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 95–121CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Polinsky AM, Shavell S (2007) Chapter 6: The theory of public enforcement of the law. In: Polinsky AM, Shavell S (eds) Handbook of law and economics, vol 1. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 457–495Google Scholar
  13. Prescott JJ, Rockoff JE (2011) Do sex offender registration and notification laws affect criminal behavior? J Law Econ 54(1):161–206CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Robinson PH, Darley JM (2003) The role of deterrence in the formulation of criminal law rules: at its worst when doing its best. Georgetown Law J 91:949–1002Google Scholar
  15. Robinson PH, Darley JM (2004) Does criminal law deter? A behavioral science investigation. Oxf J Leg Stud 23(2):173–205CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Schmidt P, Witte AD (1984) Chapter 9: Economic models of criminal behavior. In: An economic analysis of crime and justice: theory, methods, and applications. Academic, Orlando, pp 142–193Google Scholar
  17. Shavell S (2004) Foundations of economic analysis of law. Belknap Harvard.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media LLC 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Law SchoolUniversity of MichiganAnn ArborUSA