Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello


  • Peter T. LeesonEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_87


Anarchic environments are ubiquitous. Unable to rely on government, individuals in such environments develop private institutions of governance to promote social cooperation. Private governance consists of privately created social rules and mechanisms of their enforcement. Anarchy may secure better socioeconomic development than government in least-developed countries.

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA