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Frivolous Suits

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Correspondence to Yannick Gabuthy .

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Gabuthy, Y., Lambert, EA. (2019). Frivolous Suits. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_732

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