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Pacces, A.M. (2019). Hedge Fund Activism in Corporate Governance. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_716
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