Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Corporate Criminal Liability

  • Paolo Polidori
  • Désirée TeobaldelliEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_701


This entry reviews the literature on corporate criminal liability. It first describes the different forms of corporate liability and then discusses the optimal structure of corporate sanctions to deter crimes. The distinction between civil and criminal corporate liability is addressed, and a brief discussion of the corporate criminal enforcement in the United States and Europe is presented.

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of LawUniversity of UrbinoUrbinoItaly