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Judicial Delay

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Definition

Justice delay is unanimously considered a negative externality both in terms of security and institutional trust (especially when referred to criminal cases) and in terms of economic development (especially when referred to civil cases). Despite several attempts to make systems more efficient have been taken in many countries, it is almost impossible to come to a unanimous solution able to fit different principles, structures, and procedures.

We review the economic literature on this topic, focusing on Gravelle’s (1990) theory and its applications.

Introduction

It is a matter of fact that asking for justice in front of a court of law requires a very long time to get to a verdict in most of European and non-European countries. Justice delay is unanimously considered a negative externality both in terms of security and institutional trust and in terms of economic development. E.g., Jacobi and Shar (2015) pointed out that companies may prefer to breach a loss contract and...

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Correspondence to Elena D’Agostino .

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D’Agostino, E., Sironi, E., Sobbrio, G. (2019). Judicial Delay. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_671

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