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WTO: Procedural Rules

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Abstract

The Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of the World Trade Organization plays a crucial role in resolving interstate trade disputes. This entry analyzes from a law and economics perspective some of the most important procedural rules of the DSM: (i) the standing, (ii) the allocation of litigation costs, and (iii) the existing remedies.

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Notes

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    This encyclopedia includes no entries for X, Y and Z.

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Correspondence to Yong-Shik Lee .

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Lee, YS., Romano, A. (2019). WTO: Procedural Rules. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_666

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