Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Negotiated Procedures in EU Competition Law

  • Frédéric MartyEmail author
  • Mehdi Mezaguer
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_662


The enforcement of EU competition law in the field of antitrust, e.g., the sanction of abuse of dominant position and collusive agreements, increasingly uses negotiated procedures. Negotiating remedies with incriminated undertakings is a well-known practice in the field of merger control. The practice of settlements is also significantly developed in the United States. However, it remains a relative new approach under the EU competition law enforcement. This chapter presents the three main tools at the disposal of the EU Commission: the leniency program, the direct settlement, and the commitment procedures. It analyses their main challenges and issues in both legal and economic fields.

Negotiated Procedures Under EU Competition Law: An Introduction

Negotiated procedures under EU competition law mainly encompass three procedures: leniency, commitments, and direct settlements. We mainly consider the negotiated procedures implemented for the application of Articles 101 and 102...

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CNRS - UMR 7321 GREDEG, Université Côté d’AzurUniversité Nice Sophia AntipolisValbonneFrance
  2. 2.CNRS – GREDEG, Université Côte d’AzurUniversité Nice Sophia AntipolisValbonneFrance