Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Judicial Decision-Making

  • Alessandro MelcarneEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_590


Judges are not only the guardians of Human Rights and the Rule of Law. Justices equally play a key role in keeping legal certainty, thus providing a fertile ground for economic transactions. Nonetheless, scholars have only in the last two decades started to openly enquire judicial activity with the lenses of economic analysis. Claiming that judges might be sensitive to certain incentives does not necessarily undermine their independence. However, understanding the economics of judicial decisions is a key to properly design an institutional framework that might incentivize their work efficiently.

Judicial Decisions and the Economy

A growing economy and sustainable development crucially depend on the functioning of judicial systems. Enforcing institutions have been proven to be fundamental for allowing the reduction of transaction costs and the protection of property rights (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Glaeser et al. 2004; La Porta et al. 1998). Judicial institutions and...

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.EconomiX, CNRS and Université Paris NanterreNanterreFrance