Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Litigation Decision

  • Samantha BielenEmail author
  • Wim Marneffe
  • Wim Vereeck
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_589


This entry provides an overview of the main economic models of settlement and litigation decisions. Starting from the basic models, as developed by Landes (J Law Econ 14:61–108, 1971), Posner (J Leg Stud (0047–2530) 2:399, 1973), and Gould (J Leg Stud, 279–300, 1973), we describe the evolution in literature toward the application of bargaining theory. Scholars, recognizing the existence of private information and strategic behavior, increasingly modeled the process of settlement negotiations.

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Applied EconomicsHasselt UniversityDiepenbeekBelgium
  2. 2.Faculty of LawUniversity of AntwerpAntwerpBelgium