Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Violence, Interpersonal

  • Pauline GrosjeanEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_572


Interpersonal violence is the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against another person that results in a high likelihood of injury and/or death. In what follows, we will abstract from psychological forms of abuse and from sexual violence and focus on assault and homicide.

Interpersonal Violence: Roots, Remedies, and Consequences

In the Leviathan, published in 1651, Hobbes famously described the pervasiveness of interpersonal violence in the absence of a strong state. He wrote that “during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man.” He also evoked some of its consequences and in particular the fact that “in such condition there is no place for industry.”

In what follows, I will discuss the following: (i) why agents resort to interpersonal violence, with a focus on the economic origins of interpersonal violence; (ii) how...

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Further Reading

  1. Sanchez de la Sierra R (2014) On the origin of states: stationary bandits and taxation in Eastern Congo. Mimeo, Columbia. https://raulsanchezdelasierra.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/paper_1_20140616.pdf

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of EconomicsUniversity of New South WalesSydneyAustralia