Abstract
This entry discusses the economics of eminent domain, which is the government’s power to take or regulate privately owned property for the common good. It discusses the origins of the power as well as its limits, particularly as embodied in the public use and just compensation requirements. It also reviews the economics literature on how eminent domain affects incentives for efficient land use.
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We acknowledge the input of James Wen.
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Miceli, T.J., Segerson, K. (2019). Takings. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_547
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_547
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