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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics pp 1983–1991Cite as

Takings

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Abstract

This entry discusses the economics of eminent domain, which is the government’s power to take or regulate privately owned property for the common good. It discusses the origins of the power as well as its limits, particularly as embodied in the public use and just compensation requirements. It also reviews the economics literature on how eminent domain affects incentives for efficient land use.

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References

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Acknowledgments

We acknowledge the input of James Wen.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

    Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson

Authors
  1. Thomas J. Miceli
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  2. Kathleen Segerson
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Thomas J. Miceli .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. MRE and University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Faculté d’Economie, Université de Montpellier and LAMETA-UMR CNRS, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  3. DiGSPES, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

  4. IEL, Torino, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Miceli, T.J., Segerson, K. (2019). Takings. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_547

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