Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Distance Selling and Doorstep Contracts

  • Sven HoeppnerEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_537


Distance-selling and off-premises contracts are two major ways in which consumers and sellers interact. Law and economics research has established that these interactions potentially suffer from market power of sellers, from both ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetries, and from consumer bounded rationality. The most promising tool analysed and advocated by law and economics scholars is a cooling-off period coupled with a right of the consumer to withdraw from the contract. This entry surveys law and economics research on these concerns. Interestingly, relevant questions to this line of research remain, which have been brought to attention mainly by insights from behavioral economics. To exemplify and inspire further research along these lines, this entry discusses potentially perverse incentives created by withdrawal rights and the impact of fairness concerns on the consumer choice to withdraw.

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Advanced Studies in Law and Economics (CASLE)Ghent University Law SchoolGhentBelgium
  2. 2.Guest ResearcherMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective GoodsBonnGermany