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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics pp 18–25Cite as

Administrative Corruption

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Abstract

The widespread interest at national and international level in combating administrative corruption is strictly connected with the idea that it produces many negative effects, distorts incentives and weakens institutions. On the other hand, administrative corruption has been also considered as an extra-legal institution which – under certain conditions – could even produce positive effects.

Anticorruption strategies have been developed with reference to a Principal-Agent-Client model or using an incentive-disincentive approach as well as an ethical perspective.

However, preventing corruption needs a tool-box: good quality regulation, also when regulation determines sanctions; controls, which should be sustainable and informed to deterrence and planning; administrative reforms, in order to reduce monopoly and discretionary powers, to strengthen the Civil Service and to ensure transparency and information.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy

    Maria De Benedetto

Authors
  1. Maria De Benedetto
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Correspondence to Maria De Benedetto .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. MRE and University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Faculté d’Economie, Université de Montpellier and LAMETA-UMR CNRS, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  3. DiGSPES, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

  4. IEL, Torino, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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De Benedetto, M. (2019). Administrative Corruption. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_527

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