Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Voting Power Indices

  • Manfred J. HollerEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_503


This entry introduces Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, Deegan-Packel index and Public Good Index. It discusses the properties of these measures of a priori voting power focusing on monotonicity. Applications are listed.

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Further Reading

  1. Felsenthal D, Machover M (1998) The measurement of voting power. Theory and practice, problems and paradoxes. Edward Elgar, CheltenhamGoogle Scholar
  2. Holler MJ, Owen G (eds) (2001) Power indices and coalition formation. Kluwer, Boston/Dordrecht/LondonGoogle Scholar
  3. Holler MJ, Nurmi H (eds) (2013) Power, voting and voting power: 30 years after. Springer, HeidelbergGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center of Conflict Resolution (CCR)University of Hamburg, Institute of SocioEconomics (ISE)HamburgGermany