Abstract
This essay starts with discussions regarding what public enforcement is and why it is necessary. We explain economic rationales under which public enforcement becomes a superior sanctioning mode, in controlling many undesirable acts, to a wide variety of non-public sanctioning counterparts. Nonetheless, given that a large portion of the literature considers the high-cost aspect of public enforcement, the essay emphasizes the importance of lowering administrative costs and overcoming bureaucracy. From a similar perspective, we also examine the combination of public and non-public enforcement as well as the joint use of different modes of public enforcement.
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Kim, I. (2019). Public Enforcement. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_391
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_391
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