Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Constitutional Political Economy

  • Reference work entry
  • First Online:
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

  • 100 Accesses

Abstract

Economists used to be interested in analyzing decisions assuming the rules to be given. Scholars of Constitutional Political Economy (CPE) or constitutional economics have broadened the scope of economic research by analyzing both the choice of basic rule systems (constitutions) as well as their effects using the standard method of economics, i.e., rational choice.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 819.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 1,099.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Austen-Smith D (2000) Redistributing income under proportional representation. J Polit Econ 108(6):1235–1269

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benz M, Stutzer A (2004) Are voters better informed when they have a larger say in politics? – evidence for the European Union and Switzerland. Public Choice 119:31–59

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blume L, Voigt S (2014) Direct democracy and political participation. Forthcoming

    Google Scholar 

  • Blume L, Müller J, Voigt S, Wolf C (2009a) The economic effects of constitutions: replicating – and extending – Persson and Tabellini. Public Choice 139:197–225

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blume L, Müller J, Voigt S (2009b) The economic effects of direct democracy – a first global assessment. Public Choice 140:431–461

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM (1977) Freedom in constitutional contract – perspectives of a political economist. Texas A&M University Press, College Station/London

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan J (1978) A contractarian perspective on anarchy. In: Pennock JR, Chapman JW (eds). Anarchism. Anarchism, New York, pp 29–42

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM (1987) The constitution of economic policy. Am Econ Rev 77:243–250

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan J (1986) Political economy and social philosophy In: ders.; Liberty, market and state – political economy in the 1980s. New York: Wheatsheaf Books, pp 261–74

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM, Tullock G (1962) The calculus of consent – logical foundations of constitutional democracy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Duverger M (1954) Political parties: their organization and activity in the modern state. Wiley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Elkins Z, Ginsburg T, Melton J (2009) The endurance of national constitutions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Elster J (1991) Arguing and bargaining in two constituent assemblies, The Storrs Lectures

    Google Scholar 

  • Elster J (1993) Constitution-making in Eastern Europe: rebuilding the boat in the Open Sea. Public Adm 71(1/2):169–217

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feld LP, Savioz M (1997) Direct democracy matters for economic performance: an empirical investigation. Kyklos 50(4):507–538

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feld L, Kirchgässner G, Schaltegger C (2003) Decentralized taxation and the size of government: evidence from Swiss state and local governments, CESifo working paper 1087, Dec

    Google Scholar 

  • Frey B, Stutzer A (2006) Direct democracy: designing a living constitution. In: Congleton R (ed) Democratic constitutional design and public policy – analysis and evidence. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 39–80

    Google Scholar 

  • Ginsburg T, Elkins Z, Blount J (2009) Does the process of constitution-making matter? Ann Rev Law Sci 5:5.1–5.23

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek F (1939) Economic conditions of inter-state federalism. New Commonw Quart S2:131–149

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayo B, Voigt S (2013) Endogenous constitutions: politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don’t. J Econ Behav Organ 88:47–61

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Inman R, Rubinfeld D (1997) Rethinking federalism. J Econ Perspect 11(4):43–64

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Matsusaka J (1995) Fiscal effects of the voter initiative: evidence from the last 30 years. J Polit Econ 102(2):587–623

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Matsusaka J (2004) For the many or the few. The initiative, public policy, and American Democracy. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • McGuire RA, Ohsfeldt RL (1986) An economic model of voting behavior over specific issues at the constitutional convention of 1787. J Econ Hist 46(1):79–111

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McGuire RA, Ohsfeldt RL (1989a) Self-Interest, agency theory, and political voting behavior: the ratification of the United States Constitution. Am Econ Rev 79(1):219–234

    Google Scholar 

  • McGuire RA, Ohsfeldt RL (1989b) Public choice analysis and the ratification of the constitution. In: Grofman B, Wittman (Hrsg) D (eds) The Federalist papers and the new institutionalism. Agathon, New York, pp 175–204

    Google Scholar 

  • North DC (1981) Structure and change in economic history. Norton, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Oates W (1999) An essay on fiscal federalism. J Econ Lit 37(3):1120–1149

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oates W (2005) Toward A second-generation theory of fiscal federalism. Int Tax Public Financ 12(4):349–373

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Persson T, Tabellini G (2000) Political Economics – Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge et al.: The MIT Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Persson T, Tabellini G (2003) The economic effects of constitutions. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Persson T, Roland G, Tabellini G (1997) Separation of powers and political accountability. Q J Econ 112:310–327

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Persson T, Roland G, Tabellini G (2000) Comparative politics and public finance. J Polit Econ 108(6):1121–1161

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Belknap, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Robinson J, Torvik R (2008) Endogenous Presidentialism. available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w14603

  • Rodden J (2003) Reviving leviathan: fiscal federalism and the growth of government. Int Organ 57:695–729

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tanzi V (2000) Some politically incorrect remarks on decentralization and public finance. In: Dethier J-J (ed) Governance, decentralization and reform in China, India and Russia. Kluwer, Boston, pp 47–63

    Google Scholar 

  • Tiebout C (1956) A pure theory of local expenditures. J Polit Econ 64:416–424

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Voigt S (1999) Explaining constitutional change – a positive economics approach. Elgar, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • Voigt S (2011) Positive constitutional economics II – a survey of recent developments. Public Choice 146(1–2):205–256

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Voigt S (2013) Veilonomics: on the use and utility of veils in constitutional political economy. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2227339

  • Voigt S, Blume L (2012) The economic effects of federalism and decentralization: a cross-country assessment. Public Choice 151:229–254

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wicksell K (1896) Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen. Jena, Fischer

    Google Scholar 

Further Reading

  • Voigt S (1997) Positive constitutional economics – a survey. Public Choice 90:11–53

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Voigt S (2011) Empirical constitutional economics: onward and upward? J Econ Behav Organ 80(2):319–330

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

    Stefan Voigt

Authors
  1. Stefan Voigt
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Stefan Voigt .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. MRE and University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Faculté d’Economie, Université de Montpellier and LAMETA-UMR CNRS, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  3. DiGSPES, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

  4. IEL, Torino, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature

About this entry

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this entry

Voigt, S. (2019). Constitutional Political Economy. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation