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Crime: Organized Crime and the Law

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Abstract

This entry reviews the literature on the economics of organized crime. While the economics of organized crime is a small subfield of economics, it can offer insights in unexpected areas of economics. The field began some 40 years ago with the study of organized crime and its participation in illicit activities such as prostitution and gambling. Over time, the economic analysis of organized crime has expanded to address broader questions of governance in the absence of formal institutions.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Hunter College and the Graduate Center, CUNY, New York, NY, USA

    Matthew J. Baker

Authors
  1. Matthew J. Baker
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Correspondence to Matthew J. Baker .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. MRE and University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Faculté d’Economie, Université de Montpellier and LAMETA-UMR CNRS, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  3. DiGSPES, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

  4. IEL, Torino, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Baker, M.J. (2019). Crime: Organized Crime and the Law. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_16

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