Ethics and Environmental Policy

Abstract

This chapter offers a survey of important factors for the consideration of the moral obligations involved in confronting the challenges of climate change. The first step is to identify as carefully as possible what is known about climate change science, predictions, concerns, models, and both mitigation and adaptation efforts. While the present volume is focused primarily on the mitigation side of reactions to climate change, these mitigation efforts ought to be planned in part with reference to what options and actions are available, likely, and desirable for adaptation. Section “Understanding Climate Change,” therefore, provides an overview of the current understanding of climate change with careful definitions of terminology and concepts along with the presentation of the increasingly strong evidence that validates growing concern about climate change and its probable consequences. Section “Uncertainties and Moral Obligations Despite Them” addresses the kinds of uncertainty at issue when it comes to climate science. The fact that there are uncertainties involved in the understanding of climate change will be shown to be consistent with there being moral obligations to address climate change, obligations that include expanding the knowledge of the subject, developing plans for a variety of possible adaptation needs, and studying further the various options for mitigation and their myriad costs. Section “Traditions and New Developments in Environmental Ethics” covers a number of moral considerations for climate change mitigation, opening with an examination of the traditional approaches to environmental ethics and then presenting three pressing areas of concern for mitigation efforts: differential levels of responsibility for action that affects the whole globe, the dangers of causing greater harm than is resolved, and the motivating force of diminishing and increasingly expensive fossil fuels that will necessitate and likely speed up innovation in energy production and consumption that will be required for human beings to survive once fossil fuels are exhausted.

Introduction

Few subjects are as complex and as frequently oversimplified as climate change. After big snowfalls in winters past, news outlets have featured various observers of these local events, who dismiss the idea of global warming with statements such as “so much for the global warming theory” (LaHay 2000). On the other hand, climate scientists note that Earth’s average temperature has risen over time, and as a result, they predict increases in temperature extremes and vaporization of water that, in turn, lead to an expectation of increased snowfall in some years. Problems of understanding and misunderstanding such as these are important causes of confusion in discussions about climate change, and those problems and that confusion combined with the complexity of the issues at stake add considerable challenge to addressing the topic of focus in this chapter: the ethics of climate change mitigation.

This chapter will argue that despite limitations to knowledge about the complexities of the climate system, certain efforts must be undertaken to prepare for and address the developments in climate change. The science on the subject is growing increasingly compelling, showing that there is need to work toward mitigating the causal forces that are bringing about climate change along with preparing adaptations to changes in climate, some of which have already begun (Walther et al. 2002). Furthermore, the existence of uncertainties with respect to climate science calls for more study of the subject of climate change, with greater collaboration than is already at work. Calling for further study of the subject, however, does not imply the postponement of all or any particular measure of precaution and potential action. This chapter will examine the current knowledge about climate change as well as the moral dimensions at issue in both seeking to minimize those changes and working to prepare for the changes and their effects.

When the term “mitigation ” arises in this chapter, it is important to keep in mind a consistent meaning. To mitigate something generally means to make it less harsh and less severe, but in relation to climate change, mitigation carries a more precise meaning. The term refers to human actions taken to reduce the forces that are believed responsible for the increase of the average temperature of the Earth. The primary concern with climate change is the increase of global average temperature, and mitigation is aimed at decreasing the rate of growth of this global temperature and stabilizing it or even decreasing it should it rise too high. Mitigation is sometimes referred to as abatement. Generally, the idea of abatement is either to reduce the rate of growth that is or will likely be problematic or to actually reverse the trend and reduce global average temperature. In contrast to mitigation, a second category of response to climate change is to find ways of adapting life to new conditions, the method of adaptation. Adaptation refers to adjustments made in response to changing climates that moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007a). The interesting issue that arises in focusing on climate change mitigation – the efforts to decrease the causal forces of rising global temperatures – is that subtle changes in temperature might be the kind to which some or even many people will be able to adapt relatively easily. For instance, if people live on coastal lands that are increasingly inundated, there are ways of reclaiming land from water or places to which people can move in adaptation to the climate changes. Other adaptations might include systems of planned agricultural crop changes prepared to avoid problems that could arise in growing food for the world’s increasing population. An important consideration about adaptation is that while humans may be able to change and adjust to changing climates, natural ecosystems and habitats may not, a point that will also be addressed in this chapter.

There are certainly reasons to worry about sudden, great changes, but more gradual and less severe changes raise a host of ethical issues. For instance, it is reasonable to ask whether a farmer has the moral right to grow a certain crop. If so, then it may be that people have a responsibility to avoid changing the climate. Belief in such a right, however, could be considered highly controversial. What if farmers could reasonably expect some help in adapting the crops that they raise to new conditions? This idea would lessen the moral concern over the ability to grow a certain crop in a particular region, and thus a matter of adaptation would have bearing on the moral dimensions of climate change mitigation.

It is likely that the best solution to address the ill effects of climate change will require a combination of mitigation and adaptation strategies. A central claim of this chapter, therefore, is that the ethics of climate change mitigation must not be considered in isolation from the options available for adaptation. Of the two, however, the more controversial, morally speaking, are abatement efforts or mitigation. This is because when climate conditions change, there will be no choice for people but to adapt to new circumstances if presented with serious challenges for survival, at least until humans are able to exert control in a desirable way on the trends in global climate. But abatement efforts, on the other hand, require sacrifices early, before certainty exists about the exact nature and extent of the problems to come and whom the problems, benefits, and mitigating efforts will most affect and how.

Accompanying the problem of complexity that exists in climate change is a necessary challenge of uncertainty. The approach of addressing change through adaptive measures can be started early and is also possible as some more gradual changes occur, such as in the evacuation of islands that slowly disappear under the rising level of the sea. Other problems, however, are predicted to occur swiftly, such as in the potential disruption of the ocean conveyor, a “major threshold phenomenon” that could bring “significant climatic consequences,” such as severe droughts (Gardiner 2004, pp. 562–563). The problem of knowledge, of the limits to human abilities to identify where suffering or benefits will occur, under what form, by which mechanisms, implies that preventive adaptations may be impossible in the face of sudden changes in global climates. Furthermore, if there existed no idea of changes that might occur, this limited knowledge might render the effects of changing conditions less troubling morally speaking. But the fact is that today many scientists have devised models that suggest potential outcomes of climate change and so undercut the option of ignorant dismissal or avoidance of moral obligation. Limited knowledge about climate change first and foremost calls for increasing the knowledge and study of the subject, but it also demands consideration of the kinds of problems that can be expected, weighed against the anticipated costs of alleviating the worst of the threats.

This chapter will offer a survey of a number of important factors for the consideration of the moral obligations involved in confronting the challenges of climate change. The first step is to identify as carefully as possible what is known about climate change science, predictions, concerns, models, and both mitigation and adaptation efforts. While the present volume is focused primarily on the mitigation side of reactions to climate change, these mitigation efforts ought to be planned in part with reference to what options and actions are available, likely, and desirable for adaptation. Section “Understanding Climate Change,” therefore, provides an overview of current understanding of climate change with careful definitions of terminology and concepts along with the presentation of the increasingly strong evidence that validates growing concern about climate change and its probable consequences. Next, section “Uncertainties and Moral Obligations Despite Them” will address the kinds of uncertainty at issue when it comes to climate science. The fact that there are uncertainties involved in human understanding of climate change will be shown to be consistent with there being moral obligations to address climate change. As mentioned above, these are obligations to know more than is currently known, to develop plans for a variety of possible adaptation needs, and to study further the various options for mitigation and their myriad costs. Plus, Gardiner (2004) presented a convincing case for the weighing of options that concludes in accepting the consequences of a small decrease in GNP from setting limits on global greenhouse gas emissions. Gardiner’s argument is compelling even in the face of uncertainty. After all, the uncertainties involved in climate change resemble uncertainties that motivate moral precaution in so many other spheres of human conduct. Finally, section “Traditions and New Developments in Environmental Ethics” covers a number of moral considerations for climate change mitigation. This section opens with an examination of the traditional approaches to environmental ethics and then presents three pressing areas of concern for mitigation efforts: differential levels of responsibility for action that affects the whole globe, the dangers of causing greater harm than is resolved (with geoengineering efforts, among others), and the motivating forces of diminishing and increasingly expensive fossil fuels that will necessitate and likely speed up innovation in energy production and consumption that will be required for human beings to survive once fossil fuels are exhausted.

Understanding Climate Change

Given the complexity of addressing global climate change, it is crucial to clarify the meaning of a number of key terms, forces, and strategies for mitigation, so this first section will begin with a description of central terms and concepts at issue. The section then covers perceptions and methods for describing climate change because ideologies and affective influences on discourse about climate change can be used to mislead the public about the nature and the state of climate science. After that, the section examines the state of scientific knowledge and the predictions that the scientific community has presented about the future of climate change. This is important in order to grasp the extent of concern that world leaders and publics ought to feel about the future of the world’s climates. Finally, this section will close with a brief description of the various proposals that have been considered for mitigating climate change.

Terminology and Concepts

Uncertainty, confusion, and misunderstanding result from poorly or ambiguously defined terminology and concepts, and this is especially the case with the topic of climate change. Climate change is complex and often elicits heated and impassioned public discourse. To reduce such problems, this section provides definitions for terms and concepts that are essential for both an explanation of what is known about climate change and for consideration of the broader topic of ethics and climate change mitigation. Some of these definitions are contested, and in such cases, the preferred definitions presented here will be contrasted with other definitions found in the literature, along with provision of an explanation for the selections made.

Weather and Climate

The term “weather ” refers to short-term atmospheric conditions occurring in a specific time and place and identified by the sum of selected defining variables that can include temperature, precipitation, humidity, cloudiness, air pressure, wind (velocity and direction), storminess, and more. Weather is measured and reported at the scale of moments, hours, days, and weeks. Climate, on the other hand, is defined (in a narrow sense) as the aggregate of day-to-day weather conditions that have been averaged over longer periods of time such as a month, a season, a year, decades, or thousands to millions of years. Climate is a statistical description that includes not just the average or mean values of the relevant variables but also the variability of those values and the extremes (McKnight and Hess 2000; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007b).

The Climate System

Understanding climate entails more than consideration of just the aggregated day-to-day weather conditions averaged over longer periods of time. Those average atmospheric conditions operate within the wider context of what is called the climate system that includes not just the atmosphere but also the hydrosphere, the cryosphere, the Earth’s land surface, and the biosphere.

• The atmosphere is a mixture of gasses that lie in a relatively thin envelope that surrounds the Earth and is held in place by gravity. The atmosphere also contains suspended liquid and solid particles that “can vary considerably in type and concentration and from time to time and place to place” (Kemp 2004, p. 37). On average, 50 % of the atmospheric mass lies between sea level and 5.6 km (3.48 miles or 18,372 ft) of altitude. To highlight how thin this is, consider that the peak of Mt. McKinley in Alaska is 6.19 km (20,320 ft) above sea level and, as a result, the density of air is less than 50 % of that available at sea level or that the peak of Mt. Everest at 8.85 km (29,029 ft) has less than 32 % of the air density that is available at sea level. Commercial jet airliners generally fly at about 10.5 km (35,000 ft) above sea level, and humans would lapse into unconsciousness very quickly if cabin pressure were to decrease suddenly at this altitude (Strahler and Strahler 1978).

• The hydrosphere consists of liquid surface water such as the ocean, seas, lakes, and rivers, along with groundwater, soil water, and, importantly, water vapor in the atmosphere.

• The cryosphere consists of all snow, ice (glaciers and ice sheets), and frozen ground (including permafrost) that lie on and beneath the surface of the Earth.

• Earth’s land surface consists of the naturally occurring rock and soil along with the structures (buildings, roads, etc.) that humans have constructed.

• The biosphere consists of all living organisms, both plant and animal, on land, in fresh water, and in the ocean, including derived dead organic matter such as litter, soil organic matter, and ocean detritus.

The climate system functions by means of complex interactions among these five components in which flows and fluxes of energy and matter take place through myriad processes such as radiation, convection, evaporation, transpiration, chemical exchanges, and many more (Climate Change 2007c). Given this complexity, climate science is an interdisciplinary endeavor that necessarily involves the interactions and contributions of a wide range of the physical sciences such as physics, chemistry, biology, ecology, oceanography, and the atmospheric sciences. Moreover, because human existence involves interactions with climate, the social sciences such as psychology, political science, and sociology also play important roles in human understanding. In addition, climate operates over time and space, so the synthesizing disciplines of history and geography have much to contribute as well. Furthermore, as shown later in this chapter, the humanities contribute to the understanding of the social dimensions of climate systems when it comes to considering the moral implications of various situations and actions in response to climate change.

Climate Change

The most recent definition of climate change developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will be used in this chapter:

Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer (Climate Change 2007c, p. 78; see also USCCSP (United States Climate Change Science Program) 2007).

Importantly, this definition is solely descriptive and includes no reference to causation, particularly no indication of the extent to which any changes in climate result from natural or human (anthropogenic) causes. Other definitions of climate change include causation, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:

“Climate change ” means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods (UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) 1992, p. 3).

The first definition was selected for use in this chapter because it focuses on identifying and describing observed changes in climate and specifically refrains from assigning causation to either natural or anthropogenic processes. As a result, it draws attention to the distinction between two aspects of inquiry: (1) questions related to the presence, extent, and direction of changes in climate and (2) questions about causation of any observed changes, especially determinations of natural or anthropogenic causes. Views about (2) are often disconnected from questions about presence, extent, and direction of change and also tend to generate more contentious debate, especially in public and political discourse. As means to reduce contention, it is helpful to make the clear distinction between these two aspects of inquiry, and such clarity is especially important in this chapter, considering issues of ethics, mitigation, and adaptation. Additionally, and importantly, the selected definition implies no specific type of change(s) but instead fosters recognition that changes can occur in all manner of the variables that constitute climate such as temperature, precipitation, humidity, cloud cover, etc. (this point is further elaborated below with respect to the terms “climate change” and “global warming”).

An additional reason to clarify the difference between (1) and (2) is that consideration of (1) generally engenders less controversy, while the task of determining who should act in addressing any needs that arise from climate change will depend in part on how one addresses issue (2). As such, (2) is not to be ignored in addressing the ethics of climate change, but after untangling (1) from (2), the problems to be addressed can be recognized for what they are more easily.

Climate Variability

Most definitions of climate variability found in the literature differ little from the above definitions of climate change. For example, as defined in the Synthesis Report for the IPCC Fourth Assessment (Climate Change 2007c, pp. 78–79), the two terms actually seem synonymous in that they both refer to changes occurring on timescales of multiple decades or longer and they both allow for natural and anthropogenic causes. Other definitions of climate variability retain the focus on timescales of multiple decades or longer but limit climate variability to only natural causes (Batterbee and Binney 2008; Climate Research Program 2010). In this chapter, however, the term will refer to something different from either of these uses.

The term “climate variability” is used in this chapter in recognition that the long-term, statistical averages of the variables that define climates can contain substantial variation around the mean. Droughts, rainy periods, El Niño events, etc., occur in time periods of a year to as much as three decades within climates that are considered to be stable as well as within climates that are experiencing changes in the longer term. This variability is different from extreme weather events such as floods and heat waves that occur on timescales of hours, days, and weeks, and it is also different from the long-term climate changes that occur on scales that span multiple decades to millions of years (which have already been defined above as “climate change”).

The reasons to differentiate climate variability from climate change in this way are twofold. First, climate variability can generate considerable “noise” in the data that can lead to erroneous conclusions about climate change. For example, Fig. 1 shows two levels of variability – interannual and multi-decadal – that are present in the observed global temperature record that extends from 1880 to 2009. Interannual variability (variability from year to year) is as much as 0.3 °C (0.54 °F), a range that could be expressed as 1 year with a very hot summer and a mild winter followed by a second year with a mild summer and a very cold winter. The conditions present in either of these years could lead people to make poor judgments about climate. In particular, the long-term warming trend that the graph shows occurring across the full 119-year period is sometimes dismissed because people generally give greater weight in decision making and opinion formation to immediate affective sensory input over cognitive consideration of statistics (Weber 2010) (more will be said below about human decision making that is affect based compared to a basis on statistical description). The variability over several decades is exhibited in Fig. 1 for the time period 1940–1980, which shows a plateau within the longer-term, 119-year warming trend. During this shorter time period, media reports and even a few researchers erroneously forecast “global cooling” based on the observational record at the time that included inadequate and uncertain data from years earlier than this time period and, obviously, no data beyond 1980 (de Blij 2005, p. 85).

Fig. 1

A line plot of the global land-ocean temperature index from 1880 to 2009, with the base period 1951–1980. The dotted black line is the annual mean and the solid black line is the 5-year mean. The gray bars show uncertainty estimates (GISS (Goddard Institute for Space Studies) 2010a)

The second important reason for distinguishing between climate variability and climate change in the way defined in this chapter is related to dynamic equilibrium in ecosystems. Dynamic equilibrium results as ecosystems adapt to dynamic, ongoing forces that are not so extreme as to produce catastrophic changes. This dynamic equilibrium occurs because the change forces are not dramatic enough (or they cancel each other out), so that relative stability in the ecosystem can be perpetuated as the organisms (plants and animals) and the physical environment respond with adjustments that are within their adaptive capacities. In general, ecosystem adaptive capacity is not exceeded (and dynamic equilibrium is maintained) as a result of climate variability as defined here, but climate change, on the other hand, often exceeds this capacity and leads to fundamental alterations of the ecosystems. Such fundamental alterations occurring in natural ecosystems include processes such as species extinction, changes in community compositions, changes in ecological interactions, changes in geographical distributions, etc. Fundamental alterations can also occur within ecosystems upon which humans depend, leading to such changes as increases/decreases in agricultural productivity and the availability of water, changes in storm patterns, etc. (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007a). These effects on both natural and human ecosystems will be discussed in more detail in what follows, but the important point here is that climate variability rarely produces such fundamental alterations, whereas climate change frequently can.

Global Warming and Global Average Temperature

Global warming is defined as an increase in the average temperature of Earth’s surface NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) 2007. As Fig. 1 illustrates, this average surface temperature has increased by 0.75 °C ± 0.3 °C (1.35 °F ± 0.54 °F) between 1880 and 2009. While this change might seem small, the paleoclimate record demonstrates that even “mild heating can have dramatic consequences” such as advancing or retreating glaciers, sea level changes, and changes in precipitation patterns that can all force considerable changes in human activity and push natural ecosystems beyond dynamic equilibrium (Hansen 2009). The graph in Fig. 1 comes from NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies Surface Temperature Analysis (GISTEMP) database which contains temperature observations from land and sea from 1880 to the present (GISS (Goddard Institute for Space Studies) 2010b). It is one of the three such large databases of Earth surface atmospheric observations that all begin in the mid- to late nineteenth century and extend to the present. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) maintains the second database that is titled the Global Historical Climatology Network (GHCN), and while this database contains observations from land stations only, it includes precipitation and air pressure data as well as temperature (National Climatic Data Center 2008). The third database is abbreviated HadCRUT3 which reflects the source of the dataset being a collaborative project of the Met Office Hadley Center of the UK National Weather Service (“Had”) and the Climate Research Unit (“CRU”) at the University of East Anglia. The Hadley Center provides marine surface temperature data, and the Climate Research Unit provides the land surface temperature data. These three databases are not completely independent because they share some of the same observation stations, but nevertheless, some differences in the raw data exist, and the three centers work independently using different approaches to the compilation and analysis done on the datasets. As such, the comparisons of results from the different databases allow for verification. Considerable consistency is apparent across the databases, especially in the overall trend of global warming since 1880. The different centers “work independently and use different methods in the way they collect and process data to calculate the global average temperature. Despite this, the results of each are similar from month to month and year to year, and there is definite agreement on temperature trends from decade to decade. Most importantly, they all agree that global average temperature has increased over the past century and this warming has been particularly rapid since the 1970s” (Stott 2011).

Figure 2 shows the temperature record for each of the three datasets superimposed upon one another, and the consistency among them is clear. In addition, research has been done to identify and quantify uncertainty in the data, and good estimates of the uncertainty indicate that the data are valid. As one such study stated:

Fig. 2

Correlation between the three global average temperature records. All three datasets show clear correlation and a marked warming trend, particularly over the past three decades. The HadCRUT3 graph shows uncertainty bands which tighten up considerably after 1945 (WMO (World Meteorological Organization) 2010)

Since the mid twentieth century, the uncertainties in global and hemispheric mean temperatures are small, and the temperature increase greatly exceeds its uncertainty. In earlier periods the uncertainties are larger, but the temperature increase over the twentieth century is still significantly larger than its uncertainty (Brohan et al. 2006, p. 1).

The temperature records shown in Fig. 2 for each of the three centers are developed as each center uses its dataset to calculate a “global average temperature,” both for the past and for monthly updates, and it is these values that are displayed on the graphs in the figure. While these calculations are done differently at the three centers, all three use the following general procedure. First, they expend considerable efforts to obtain the most accurate data possible and define the uncertainty that remains in those data. Then, the monthly average temperature value for each reporting station is converted into what is called an “anomaly.” The anomaly of each reporting station is calculated by subtracting the monthly average value from the average value that the station has maintained over some relatively long-term “base period” (e.g., the HadCRUT3 uses the period 1961–1990 as its base period). The reason for using anomalies is stated as follows:

For example, if the 1961–1990 average September temperature for Edinburgh in Scotland is 12 °C and the recorded average temperature for that month in 2009 is 13 °C, the difference of 1 °C is the anomaly and this would be used in the calculation of the global average (Stott 2011).

One of the main reasons for using anomalies is that they remain fairly constant over large areas. So, for example, an anomaly in Edinburgh is likely to be the same as the anomaly further north in Fort William and at the top of Ben Nevis, the UK’s highest mountain. This is even though there may be large differences in absolute temperature at each of these locations.

The anomaly method also helps to avoid biases. For example, if actual temperatures were used and information from an Arctic observation station was missing for that month, it would mean the global temperature record would seem warmer. Using anomalies means missing data such as this will not bias the temperature record (Stott 2011; see National Climatic Data Center 2010a for additional explanation of the calculation and use of anomalies as used for the National Climate Data Center’s GHCN system).

Even though using anomalies produces the most accurate record of Earth’s global average temperature, it is still interesting to calculate one single absolute “global average temperature.” Using the GHCN dataset (National Climatic Data Center 2010b), the average value for the last 10 years, the warmest decade on record (GISS (Goddard Institute for Space Studies) 2010a; Atmospheric Administration 2009; WMO (World Meteorological Organization) 2009), produces a global average temperature for planet Earth of 14.4 °C or 58 °F.

Climate Forcing and Climate Feedback

Climate forcing refers to the processes that produce changes in the climate. The word force is generally defined as “strength or energy that is exerted or brought to bear [and that often] causes motion or change” (Merriam-Webster 2003). With respect to Earth’s climate system, a variety of forces cause climates to change. These are called “climate forcings,” and they are all related to Earth’s “energy balance,” that is, the balance between incoming energy from the Sun and outgoing energy from the Earth. The forcings can be internal or external. “Internal forcings” occur within the climate system and include processes such as changes in atmospheric composition or changes in ice cover that cause different rates of absorption/reflection of solar radiation. “External forcings” originate from outside the climate system and include processes such as changes in Earth’s orbit around the Sun and volcanic eruptions. Forcings can be naturally occurring, such as those resulting from solar activity or volcanic eruptions, or anthropogenic in origin, for example, the emission of greenhouse gases or deforestation (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007a, p. 9).

A feedback is defined as a change that occurs within the climate system in response to a forcing mechanism. A feedback is called “positive” when it augments or intensifies the effects of the forcing mechanism or “negative” when it diminishes or reduces the effects caused by that original forcing mechanism (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007a, p. 875).

Forcing and feedback mechanisms often interact in complex ways that make it difficult to decipher the processes and dynamics of climate change. This difficulty also frequently frustrates policymakers, the media, and the public, and it can result in the dissemination of misinformation, both intentional and unintentional, into the public discourse. One example of this relates to the relationship between carbon dioxide (CO₂) and temperature. While it is relatively easy to understand that increasing concentrations of atmospheric CO₂ can increase the naturally occurring greenhouse effect thereby causing global warming, confusion and misinformation result when research brings to light a climate record in which changes in the atmospheric CO₂ level lag behind changes in temperature by 800–1,000 years. The legitimate question arises as to how it could be possible that CO₂ causes global warming if the rise in temperature occurs before the increase in the atmospheric concentration of CO₂. While the question is legitimate, unfortunately, some who are disposed to doubt claims of global warming neither seek answers to the question nor pursue additional investigation. Instead, they simply assert the premise that because CO₂ lags temperature, it cannot possibly be the cause of global warming. However, a more objective review of the scientific literature emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between forcings and feedbacks.

The initial, external forcing that begins the temperature changes observed in the climate record stems from fluctuations in the orbital relations between the Sun and Earth, and these fluctuations produce rather small changes in the amount of solar radiation reaching Earth (Hays et al. 1976). This relatively weak forcing action causes small temperature changes that are then amplified by other processes (Lorius et al. 1990). One such amplifying process that appears to be quite significant occurs because ocean temperature changes also change the ocean’s capacity to retain soluble CO₂. As this capacity changes, it causes CO₂ to either be released from the oceans into the atmosphere (during times of warming temperatures) or removed from the atmosphere and dissolved into the oceans (during times of cooling temperatures). Consequently, CO₂ operates in these situations as a positive feedback mechanism that augments the temperature change. In other words, it enhances the greenhouse effect and amplifies temperature increases during times of warming and reduces the greenhouse effect and reinforces temperature decreases during times of cooling (Martin et al. 2005). Careful analysis therefore suggests that a climate record which shows CO₂ operating as a feedback mechanism neither negates nor renders less likely the potential that CO₂ could operate as an initial forcing mechanism as well. Considering that the atmospheric concentration of CO₂ has increased by 25 % in the last 50 years (Atmospheric Administration 2010), it is entirely possible that this increasing CO₂ concentration is functioning as the forcing agent for contemporary global warming. Simply put, it is a false premise to claim that CO₂ could not be causing contemporary global warming because CO₂ has been observed to lag behind temperature changes in the past. This false premise has been lampooned by the analogous statement that “Chickens do not lay eggs, because they have been observed to hatch from them” (Bruno 2009).

Global Warming Versus Climate Change

The terms “global warming” and “climate change” have been defined above, and those definitions will not be repeated here. But it is important to emphasize the difference between the two terms and the significance of exercising precision in use of them. While “global warming” is a useful way to refer to the increase of global average temperature that strong scientific evidence shows has occurred over the last 130 years (Fig. 2), for some people, the term carries the automatic connotation that human activity is the cause of this observed temperature increase. As stated earlier, a clear distinction should be made between questions that, on the one hand, relate to the changes in climate, if any, that are occurring and, on the other hand, the causes of any identified changes, specifically, naturally occurring or anthropogenic. Because the term “global warming” carries the more polemical and politicized connotation, it poses a higher probability of conflating the two questions than does the term “climate change” which has not yet attracted such politicized interpretations. Consequently, in general, the term “climate change” is preferable.

A second deficiency with the term “global warming” is the one-dimensional and totalizing change that it implies. Although the average temperature of planet Earth is increasing, the temperature change that any particular place on the Earth might experience could be cooling instead of warming, or perhaps that place might be experiencing no change in temperature at all. But the term “global warming” is easily, and perhaps most naturally, understood to mean that all places on the Earth will experience warming. Moreover, even if the term is explained, it does not readily lend itself to the broader understanding that although the global average temperature is increasing, it is not necessarily the case that temperature is increasing at any given place on Earth. The term “climate change,” on the other hand, does not imply this uniform nature of change and thus possesses greater capacity to communicate the potential for different changes occurring in different places and regions. In addition, the term “global warming” implies a narrow view of the nature of changes that can occur in the climate system, namely, an exclusive focus on temperature. But the possible changes to climate are not restricted to just the climate variable of temperature, and the observed increase in global average temperature has been associated with changes in a range of other climate variables that include precipitation amounts, timing and patterns, cloudiness, humidity, wind direction and velocity, storminess, and more. While the term “global warming” places the focus on temperature, the term “climate change” offers a much richer capacity to incorporate these other types of changes as well and, as a result, is generally emerging as the preferred term.

Thresholds and Tipping Points

The term “threshold” in ecology and environmental science means “a fixed value at which an abrupt change in the behavior of a system is observed” (Park 2008, p. 450). In climate science, the term “climate threshold” means the point at which some forcing of the climate system “triggers a significant climatic or environmental event which is considered unalterable, or recoverable only on very long time-scales, such as widespread bleaching of corals or a collapse of oceanic circulation systems” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007a, p. 872). Substantial research indicates that climate changes are prone to such thresholds, or “tipping points,” at which climate on a global scale or climates at regional scales can suddenly experience major change (Committee on Abrupt Climate Change 2002; Lenton et al. 2008). A wide number of complex systems exhibit similar threshold events – financial markets, ecosystems, and even epileptic seizures and asthma attacks – in which the system seems stable right up until the time when the sudden change occurs (Scheffer et al. 2009). Research has provided general ideas on where these thresholds or tipping points might operate with respect to climate – the loss of Arctic sea ice or Antarctic ice shelves, the release of methane into the atmosphere from the melting of Siberian permafrost, or the disruption of the “oceanic conveyor belt” – but this knowledge is rudimentary at best. Scheffer and colleagues (2009) report tentative efforts to identify “early warning signs” that precede threshold events, and with respect to climate, they state that “flickering,” “rapid alterations,” or increased weather and climate “variability” seem to have preceded sudden changes observed in the climate record. But at present, predicting these climatic thresholds is vague at best. One of the authors explained the idea of thresholds and the uncertainty about them in an interview with Time magazine, “Managing the environment is like driving [on] a foggy road at night by a cliff.…You know it’s there, but you don’t know where exactly” (Walsh 2009).

Defining and Communicating Uncertainty

Clearly, climate science contains uncertainties that are endemic to the data sources used, to the understanding of processes involved, and to predictions of future trends, impacts, and outcomes. Consequently, it is essential to accompany any study of climate change with careful, explicit, and candid assessments of the levels of certainty or confidence associated with the findings or claims made. Indeed, reports or studies are suspect if they fail to include such information and/or if they make unequivocal statements about “proving” their points. To some extent, the same can be said about commentaries, news reports, or various information sources. While the politicized environment in which climate change is debated might encourage strong and definite affirmations, such statements can prove counterproductive if they are perceived or exposed as exaggerated (Weber 2010; Hodder and Martin 2009).

Numerous approaches exist for defining and communicating uncertainty, and this brief discussion here does not attempt a comprehensive overview. Instead, it focuses on the approach that the IPCC has developed for its assessment reports. The main function of the IPCC is to “assess the state of our understanding and to judge the confidence with which we can make projections of climate change, its impacts, and costs and efficacy of options,” but in its first and second assessments (1990 and 1995, respectively), the IPCC gave inadequate attention to “systematizing the process of reaching collective judgments about uncertainties and levels of confidence or standardizing the terms used to convey uncertainties and levels of confidence to the decision-maker audience” (Moss 2006, p. 5 emphasis added). Consequently, the IPCC conducted a comprehensive project to rectify these inadequacies (Moss and Schneider 2000; Manning et al. 2004), and the result was the following system for defining and communicating uncertainties in the Fourth Assessment Report published in 2007.

The first step is to present a general summary of the state of knowledge related to the topic being presented. This summary should include (1) the amount of evidence available in support of the findings and (2) the degree of consensus among experts on the interpretation of the evidence (Climate Change 2005). Figure 3 illustrates how these two factors form interacting continua that produce qualitative categories.

Fig. 3

Conceptual framework for assessing the current level of understanding (Moss 2006; Climate Change 2005)

The IPCC guidance notes for addressing uncertainty (Climate Change 2005, p. 3 emphasis in original) state that in cases where the level of knowledge is determined to be “high agreement, much evidence, or where otherwise appropriate,” additional information about uncertainty should be provided through specification of a level of confidence scale and a likelihood scale. The level of confidence scale addresses the degree of certainty that the results are correct, while the likelihood scale specifies a probability that the occurrence or outcome is taking place or will take place. The IPCC guidelines state that the level of confidence scale “can be used to characterize uncertainty that is based on expert judgment as to the correctness of a model, an analysis or a statement. The last two terms in the scale should be reserved for areas of major concern that need to be considered from a risk or opportunity perspective, and the reason for their use should be carefully explained” (Climate Change 2005, p. 4). Table 1 shows the scale. The likelihood scale is used to refer to “a probabilistic assessment of some well defined outcome having occurred or occurring in the future” (Climate Change 2005, p. 4).

Table 1 Scales of uncertainty used in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, 2007. None of these are statistically significant because no tests are conducted to determine the values. Instead, they are based on expert judgment

Adaptation and Mitigation

The terms “adaptation ” and “mitigation ” were briefly discussed in the introduction of this chapter, but the more detailed definition and explanation in Table 2 outline important distinctions that will be helpful for the sections of the chapter that follow.

Table 2 Definitions and explanations of the terms adaptation and mitigation from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 2007

Perceptions, Communication, and Language of Climate Change

Moser (Moser 2010, p. 33) writes that “a number of challenging traits make climate change a tough issue to engage with,” and she implies that something in the nature of climate change itself makes it more challenging for people to perceive and communicate about than many other, even related issues (environmental, hazards, health). She lists the following characteristics of climate change that produce this substantial challenge:

• Invisible causes: Greenhouse gasses are not visible and have no direct or immediate health implications. The same is true for other forcing agents such as Earth/Sun relations.

• Distant impacts: The lack of immediacy in temporal and geographic distance.

• Insulation of modern humans from their environment: This diminishes the perception of any changes in the climate or their significance.

• Delayed or absent gratification for taking action: Action taken today is not likely to reduce global average temperature within the lifetime of the person taking the action.

• The lack of recognition that humans have of their technological power: This produces disbelief that humans have the capacity to alter the global climate.

• Complexity and uncertainty: This leads to considerations of climate change taking on less importance than immediate needs such as family and job responsibilities.

• Inadequate signals indicating the need for change: Inertia in the climate system and lack of observable economic or social costs or benefits reduce incentives for action.

• Self-interest: Not only are many powerful forces in society interested in maintaining the status quo, but also the majority of people in developed countries defend the comforts of their modern lifestyles, even if unintentionally and unconsciously.

Weber (2010) adds additional factors that make the perception and communication of climate change difficult. First is the difference between affect-based and analysis-based processing of environmental information. The general public relies heavily on affect-based processing, that is, relying on personal experience. However, climate change is not easily detected in this manner. Climate, defined above as the aggregate of day-to-day weather conditions that have been averaged over longer periods of time, requires analysis-based processing of statistical information that includes averages, trends, and uncertainty estimates, among others. The majority of people are simply ill equipped to process this type of information, and they have little patience in attempting to decipher it. Compounding the difficulty is that “People’s fundamental values and worldviews influence which phenomena and risks they attend to and which they ignore or deny” (Weber 2010, p. 335). When limited processing capacity and patience wane, people default to reliance on their fundamental values and worldviews, which generate a wide range of responses that are generally politicized and deeply held. Several typologies exist for categorizing these responses, but Ereaut and Segnit (2006, p. 7) have developed a very useful one from empirical studies conducted in the UK that contain the four “repertoires” presented in Table 3.

Table 3 “Repertories” employed by people in response to information about climate change (Ereaut and Segnit 2006)

Future Directions: The State of Climate Change Knowledge and Future Predictions

As stated earlier, consideration of human knowledge of climate change and future predictions must differentiate two questions: What is the direction and rate of change, if any, in Earth’s climate? What is the cause, natural or anthropogenic, of any observed climate change? It is almost universally accepted across the scientific community that global average temperature is increasing in accordance with the data presented in the graph in Fig. 1. This is summarized as follows:

Since the mid twentieth century, the uncertainties in global and hemispheric mean temperatures are small, and the temperature increase greatly exceeds its uncertainty. In earlier periods the uncertainties are larger, but the temperature increase over the twentieth century is still significantly larger than its uncertainty (Brohan et al. 2006, p. 1).

With respect to differentiating natural from anthropogenic causes of this observed warming, although broad consensus of scientific judgment suggests anthropogenic causes, a substantial minority remains less convinced. The IPCC represents the former group that assigns causation to anthropogenic causes. But it has taken almost 20 years for the IPCC to reach this conclusion. Table 4 outlines relevant statements from the various IPCC Assessment Reports spanning the period 1990–2007.

Table 4 Statements from the various IPCC Assessment Reports showing the increasing levels of certainty regarding the causes of the observed increase in global average temperature spanning the period 1990–2007

Types of Mitigation Strategies

Because the focus of this handbook is climate change mitigation, various mitigation strategies are detailed elsewhere. Consequently, this section will not attempt thorough explanation of them, but will briefly list and outline the major types of mitigation strategies as a foundation for considering the ethical issues associated with them.

The most often discussed category of strategies for mitigating climate change is to reduce the emission of CO₂ that results from the combustion of fossil fuels. Public policy actions serve as the primary driver for effecting these mitigation strategies. One policy action is to simply set limits on the CO ₂ emissions from the various sources (electrical generation plants, cars, etc.) as the impetus to develop cleaner technologies. Another is the well-known cap and trade system in which a government body limits the amount of CO₂ that can be emitted and then issues (allocates or sells) permits to private firms to emit specified amounts of CO₂. Firms can then sell or buy permits as needed depending on their amount of emissions. Cap and trade has been criticized on a number of counts, most notably (1) that it increases the cost of fuel and so disproportionally affects the poor rather than the wealthy and (2) that in the places where it has been tried, for a variety of reasons, it has not reduced CO₂ emissions and has resulted in volatile emissions trading market. A proposed alternative to “cap and trade” is known as the fee and dividend system , described as follows:

… a fee is collected at the mine or port of entry for each fossil fuel (coal, oil, and gas), i.e., at its first sale in the country. The fee is uniform, a single number, in dollars per ton of carbon dioxide in the fuel. The public does not directly pay any fee or tax, but the price of the goods they buy increases in proportion to how much fossil fuel is used in their production…The carbon fee will rise gradually so that the public will have time to adjust their lifestyle, choice of vehicle, home insulation, etc., so as to minimize their carbon footprint…100 percent of the money collected from the fossil fuel companies at the mine or well is distributed uniformly to the public. Thus those who do better than average in reducing their carbon footprint will receive more of the dividend than they will pay in the added costs of the products they buy. (Hansen 2009, p. 209.

Proponents of the fee and dividend system list some of its additional benefits as (1) it is revenue neutral in that it does not raise taxes; (2) only a very small government bureaucracy is needed; (3) it “internalizes” the incentives to reduce the use of fossil energy (e.g., cost savings) across “billions of decisions ranging from commuting behavior to the design of vehicles, aircraft, cities, and so forth” (Hansen 2009, p. 211); and (4) it raises the cost of fossil energy sources to reflect their cost to society and the environment (pollution, climate change, health impacts, etc.) and to improve the competitiveness of renewables that do not carry these costs. Another climate change mitigation strategy focused on reducing production of CO₂ is population control , though it is highly controversial. Proponents argue that increasing human population causes increasing emissions of CO₂, and as a result, stabilization of human population is necessary to stabilize or reduce concentrations of atmospheric CO₂. Opponents respond that people are not pollution, but rather, the blame lies on the system that depends on fossil fuels for economic development. Instead of reducing population, they argue, policy should focus on changing that system. Further controversy has to do with the issues of liberty and family values, which can be said to conflict with policies limiting family size. A final strategy for reducing emissions of CO₂ involves improving energy efficiency and conservation. As efficiency increases, less fuel will be used, and as a result, less CO₂ will be emitted. This readily achievable and cost-effective strategy could not only reduce CO₂ emissions substantially but could also significantly reduce the world’s energy demand (IEA (International Energy Agency) 2006).

In contrast to strategies that reduce the emission of CO₂, the second category of mitigation strategies removes CO₂ from the atmosphere once it has been produced. There are a number of such strategies. Reforestation involves the planting of forests, either new forests or the restocking of existing forests that have experienced deforestation, as means to sequestrate more CO₂ from the atmosphere. The process is explained as follows:

Carbon dioxide is constantly exchanged between the atmosphere, the oceans and terrestrial ecosystems. Vegetation and soils can accumulate carbon, thus reducing the rate of CO₂ build-up in the atmosphere that is responsible for climate change… Forest ecosystems contain the majority (approximately 60 per cent) of the carbon stored in terrestrial ecosystems. Thus the world’s forests sequester and conserve more carbon than all other terrestrial ecosystems and account for 90 per cent of the annual carbon flux between the atmosphere and the earth’s land surface. (Strech and Scholz 2006, p. 861.

While reforestation efforts have potential to sequester CO₂, the effect is less than envisioned in virtually all such measures. The predominant means of reforestation is the “forest plantation” where a single species of tree is planted. The amount of carbon sequestration has been found to be 28 % less in forest plantations than in naturally occurring primary or secondary forests (Liao et al. 2010). Consequently, while not diminishing the importance of reforestation, it seems that the most efficient efforts involving forests would be to preserve existing ones. This provides good rationale to pursue a related strategy of preventing deforestation which retains the natural, primary, and secondary forests.

Another strategy to remove CO₂ from the atmosphere is called carbon capture and storage (or sometimes carbon capture and sequestration). Other chapters in this handbook provide considerable detail on this topic, so it will only be briefly defined here. Carbon capture entails trapping the CO₂ at its emission source and then transporting it to a location where it can be stored so that it does not escape into the atmosphere (usually in underground rock formations).

A final suite of strategies to mitigate the effects of CO₂ is called geoengineering , defined as a “large-scale engineering of the environment in order to combat or counteract the effects of changes in atmospheric chemistry” (Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy 1992, p. 433). They take the form of either shielding Earth from incoming solar radiation or facilitating the transport of heat energy from Earth to space, primarily by reducing the concentration of atmospheric CO₂. One of the most talked-about is to inject sulfur dioxide (several million tons per year) into the stratosphere (Kunzig 2008), where it would undergo various chemical reactions to produce sulfate particles that would scatter incoming sunlight and thereby cool the planet. It is known that this works because of observations of the effects of volcanoes that produce sulfur dioxide (SO₂), most recently, the Pinatubo volcano that injected over 20 million tons of SO₂ into the stratosphere in 1991, which resulted in a decrease of global average temperature by about 0.5 °C (1 °F) for about 1 year. The delivery of SO₂ into the stratosphere is proposed using either balloons or with planes burning high sulfur fuel, at an estimated cost of $25–$50 billion annually (Kunzig 2008). While studies indicate it would reduce global average temperature, it would not address problems associated with increasing CO₂ levels, most notably, acidification of the ocean which causes negative impacts on organisms that make calcareous structures, such as shells and corals, along with the ecosystems of which they are a part. Another strategy that promises to reduce global average temperature by reducing atmospheric CO₂ is called artificial iron fertilization of the ocean. Such fertilization occurs naturally when dust storms carry iron into the ocean and cause blooms of the photosynthesizing organisms known as phytoplankton. By artificially spreading powdered iron into the ocean, the idea is to promote the phytoplankton blooms that would absorb CO₂ through the photosynthesis process. A commercial firm named Planktos explored this idea and conducted some small-scale tests. However, they failed to gain adequate investor funding to scale up the project, primarily as a result of questions about various and potentially negative unintended consequences of the project that included adverse effects on marine organisms and ecosystems (Courtland 2008). This highlights a serious drawback to these and the various other geoengineering strategies and possible unintended consequences that would be global in scale and sometimes unstoppable.

Uncertainties and Moral Obligations Despite Them

The previous section introduced the kinds of uncertainties involved in human understanding of climate change. The first point to address concerning moral obligations in the face of uncertainty is that it is wrong to overstate the uncertainties involved. This is the case because, in large part, consequences for denying what has been well established include delaying and softening the response to problems that are likely to require significant effort and collaboration to address. Democratically, furthermore, obfuscations of the kinds that the previous section sought to undo, such as in the conflation of the issues of warming global temperatures with the causal forces bringing the warming about, only get in the way of making intelligent progress in addressing either of these concerns.

Three issues are worth covering in this section given their bearing on uncertainties and moral obligations despite them. The first concerns the ethics of news reporting about scientific developments regarding uncertainties with respect to climate change. The second regards a fallacy of reason that is committed all too often about climate change. The third one concerns caution and collective obligations in the face of uncertainty.

Ethics and Reporting About Climate Science

One important development in news reporting has been the recognition that news outlets often exhibit biases. A traditional way of thinking suggested that reporting should only be considered the relaying of facts. This outlook is generally ascribed to modernism and has inspired a reaction that has been called postmodern, a view that holds that no outlook in news reporting can be considered perfectly objective or absolutely without bias. While the postmodern movement has its flaws and excesses, it is not wrong in seeing that the long-held ideal of a “view from nowhere,” a point of view without bias, may be unachievable and imaginary.

Building upon postmodern thinking, more pragmatic approaches to knowledge have come to see biases as things to be recognized and controlled. What has come about as a result of this shift is an effort in countless news outlets always to demonstrate balance about issues that get reported. A problem that emerges is that news outlets sometimes make use of commentators, explicitly holding a point of view, but then contrast them with people whose points of view are minimally relevant to the topic being reported.

One troubling consequence of this effort to appear more credible, to issue news that is more purposefully and intentionally balanced from a political point of view, is the fact that some people want to deny the findings of science. Examples of this problem include detractors of climate science along with other examples such as those who believe that the age of the Earth should be determined by reading religious texts rather than with the scientific method. In short, when a vocal minority of people speaks up, they can make it appear as though there is balance, a 50–50 way of reporting the facts about scientific developments. When it comes to matters such as climate science, however, this development is pernicious because it promotes the idea that genuine controversies exist within the sciences when no fundamental disagreement exists among scientists. There is a moral problem at issue here in which some people use the idea of media balance to “spin” a point of view that makes uncertainties appear far greater than they are.

The motivations for misinformation or for the propagation of claims unjustified or even contradicted by science are varied. While people certainly have a right to beliefs from religious or other sources, this fact produces tension wherever such beliefs conflict with the findings of science. In many cases, these tensions are dealt with in constructive ways, but in other cases, some persons may think that their interests would be best served if scientific developments were stalled or obfuscated. Efforts of this kind surely produce troubling manipulations of the democratic need for carefully evaluated and verified political as well as scientific information.

Avoiding the Fallacy of Appealing to Ignorance

Uncertainties about climate change precipitate a common challenge to the idea that action should be taken to address it. There is an important fallacy at play in such arguments, beyond the fact that often obfuscations are made about what uncertainties there are exactly involved in climate change. It is the fallacy of appealing to ignorance.

An appeal to ignorance is a fallacy of reason that occurs when one makes a strong conclusion about the state of some subject matter on the grounds that knowledge is lacking about it. Take an example of Jack, who is a serial killer. Mindy and Alex do not know that Jack is a killer, but Mindy has a bad feeling about him, and she says so to Alex. Alex defends Jack by stating “you don’t actually know that Jack’s a bad guy, so he’s a good guy, really.” Alex holds a kind assumption that people are nice unless proven otherwise, but in this case, it is clearly wrong. Alex moves from the fact that someone lacks knowledge to some other substantive fact that the lack of knowledge clearly cannot substantiate. This fallacy of reason is called an appeal to ignorance.

The appeal to ignorance seems to be one of the most common responses to climate change efforts. People tend to imagine or pretend that the science is inconclusive, but in a way that in fact may be insufficient a challenge to the idea that people ought perhaps to take precautions. Beside this precautionary motivation, known as the Precautionary Principle, the fact is that the science is stronger than it has been in many cases portrayed, as shown in the previous sections in this chapter.

The Limits of Challenges About Uncertainty

The first thing to say here is that the uncertainty people claim is involved in scientists’ understanding of climate change is frequently overstated or misstated. In this section, let us imagine that some of the bolder claims about uncertainty with respect to climate change were true. There is still reason, nonetheless, to think that moral obligations could and do exist for people despite such a hypothetically strong uncertainty.

The common response in the environmental ethics literature to the challenge of uncertainty is that the potential harm that can come from problems such as climate change can be catastrophic (Manson 1999). Thus, even if there is uncertainty about a problem or a very small likelihood of trouble, it is typically wise and a moral obligation to avoid that catastrophic scenario. This is general practice in medical situations. When a set of possible medical courses of action are generally safe and yield little risk of adverse effects, they are almost always what one should do before other options whose effects could be catastrophic. The reason for the moral obligation to choose the less risky option is known as the Precautionary Principle. The Precautionary Principle in the context of climate change resembles what in the history of philosophy has been called Pascal’s Wager.

Pascal’s Wager is about belief in God. He argued that four options exist:

• If one does not believe in God and God exists, then a devastating outcome could ensue – eternal damnation for one’s disbelief.

• If one does not believe in God and there is no God, no problem.

• If one believes in God and there is none, then one has lost some time and effort.

• If one believes in God and there is a God, then one could receive great rewards.

This set of options, Pascal believed, is excellent reason to believe in God. Of course, religious arguments can analyze whether or not such motivations are enough for genuine belief, but the point of relation to the subject here, climate change mitigation, concerns especially the one similar circumstance that could arise for the environment. In other words, what if people do not concern themselves about the environment and in fact allow or increase the chances of catastrophic circumstances as a result? The worry involved there is something akin to that involved in risky medical practices that are not accepted in all but the rarest of cases.

The response to the wager for the environmental context is to say that there are costs of mitigation and adaptation to climate change. Of course, if there is no choice but to adapt, then those costs cannot be avoided, though they can be distributed more or less justly. When it comes to efforts to mitigate climate change, however, things like caps on greenhouse gas emissions can have profound effects on the ways in which businesses work. In short, a challenge to the Precautionary Principle emerges related to the cost-benefit analysis of action to address climate change. Neil Manson (1999) estimates that the costs of inaction could be seen as enormous, which is why people should not be afraid to enter into discussions about precautions and valuations of climate change. Environmentalists are often wary of entering into cost-benefit analyses, since it is difficult to value things like the survival of species. However, Manson also argues that environmentalists could devise strategies for valuing the costs of changes to climate. In short, there are a number of important elements that can factor into moral obligation even if there are uncertainties about climate change. There is a whole industry in the insurance business that practices the process of putting monetary value on things that average persons would have an extraordinarily difficult time valuing, since people in general do not think of the world as do those who manage risk for a living. It is important to note here in concluding this section that none of these responses to challenges of uncertainty about climate change should be construed as reason to doubt the increasingly strong evidence that suggests human beings have a significant impact on the environments on a large scale or the even more strongly defended judgment that global temperatures are increasing over the long run, occurrences for which the Precautionary Principle would prescribe that humanity to prepare (see Gardiner 2006 for an explanation of the Precautionary Principle).

Traditions and New Developments in Environmental Ethics

The study of environmental ethics has grown substantially in the last 30 years. In the background of developments in this study lie cultural beliefs about the world and humankind’s place in it. Often, the Earth is conceived as God’s gift to mankind, to be used for human purposes. At the same time, things that are gifts from God could also be considered important targets for stewardship. Stewardship refers to the duties one has to objects or property bestowed on oneself in some honored fashion, like a family heirloom or in this case a divine gift. Whether one approaches environmental ethics with a religious motivation or a secular one, a tension arises often between the idea that the Earth is property, a mere tool for human ends, and the opposing belief that human beings have a duty to take the best care they can of shared resources. This tension arises in the study of environmental ethics in the form of arguments that address human interests primarily, the anthropocentric approach, and arguments that give moral weight to things like places, animals, ecosystems, etc. The present section will cover a number of the approaches that environmental ethicists have taken for considering the moral duties human beings have to care for the environments on which they depend. The section will begin with a discussion on the tradition of environmental ethics, focusing on theories about the source of value in ethics. Next, the matter of who is affected in problems of environmental ethics is important to consider. Finally, some recent developments will be discussed, which suggest that a cultural shift is noticeably growing public acceptance for environmental values and precautions.

Sources of Value in Environmental Ethics

The traditional way of thinking about land and environments has largely been religious. In 2010, founder of southern Indiana’s Corydon Tea Party Norman Dennison explained a traditional outlook on religiously motivated opposition to understanding about climate change. Dennison explained that human-induced climate change “is a flat out lie.” According to a New York Times article, Dennison explained that “he had based his view on the preaching of Rush Limbaugh and the teaching of scripture. ‘I read my Bible,’ Mr. Dennison said. ‘He [God] made this earth for us to utilize’” (Broder 2010). Here, Dennison illustrates contempt for the findings of climate science, to be sure, but he also demonstrates the central background for thinking about environmental concern as uniquely anthropocentric and based on God’s purported decision that the Earth is intended to be used up. Rachel Carson has argued that the tradition treats the Earth as an object to be exploited and conquered, without consideration for its well-being (Carson 1962/1987).

Religious outlooks on environmental policy do not exclusively follow Dennison’s orientation to deny climate science. Matthew Hay Brown in The Baltimore Sun, for instance, asks “Where would Jesus drill?” in his article “Religious Environmentalists Hope Spill Wins Converts” (Brown 2010). What is noticeable, therefore, is that although traditional views may suggest that humankind ought to have great powers over God’s gift of the Earth, even in religious discussions, the source of environmental value and what ought to be done is neither settled nor determined for all. In particular, a central challenge to such traditional views concerns the idea that environmental ethics ought to be anthropocentric.

One of the most influential thinkers to challenge solely anthropocentric values in environmental ethics was Aldo Leopold. In A Sand County Almanac, he called for an expansive view of the source of value in ethics (Leopold 1968). He named a new kind of ethic the Land Ethic. Although Leopold was a hunter and enjoyed nature very much, he saw in nature a source of value that is independent of his enjoyment of it. In this section, it should become clear that there is common ground to be found between the different views that are presented here. Whether value is inherent in nature or not, ultimately anyone concerned must convince others to share that concern. Therefore, the anthropocentrism or the inherent value theorist like Leopold needs not only to attend significantly to human interests but to expand people’s understandings of what those interests could more intelligently appreciate.

The common tendency in debates about ethics and environmental issues is to have human beings pitted against something like an endangered animal. Some people wonder why they must be terribly concerned about rarefied fish, for example, especially when countless species have gone extinct in the past. Plus, in biology, students are taught that animals survive when they are fit for their environments. Thus, one might argue that any animal that is in danger of becoming extinct is simply showing its unfitness for present conditions, whether those conditions are man-made or not. If they become unfit for the environment by accident or by purposeful human action, what is the moral difference?

Environmentalist responses have varied to such challenges, and Leopold’s answer is straightforward. He said that inasmuch as you and he have rights and worth and deserve respect in efforts to live, so do other animals and environments. He believed that the problem fundamentally has to do with the fact that people think they simply have no obligation to the things and other forms of life in this world. As such, it follows that the right of things to live and to be can in many circumstances trump human claims on freedom to change the environments in ways that harm the natural habitats of animals, thought Leopold. In this sense, Leopold believed in the importance of human stewardship of land. He saw not only animals and plants as living things but ecosystems and natural environments as having lives as well. The reason people generally do not think about mountains as alive comes from not seeing the place of mountains in an overall living system and also not looking at them on the right scale. After all, mountains, streams, and grasslands all change and grow, erode, and serve as homes for countless animal and plant species. If people care about their own lives, it is life ultimately that counts, Leopold argued. He saw the history of ethics as a growth in consideration for people and groups and then pets and other cared-for things in an expanding circle of consideration. He believed the next step was for humans to broaden consideration even further, to include the environment. The most important element that Leopold brought to the attention of moral thought had to do with this broadening of moral consideration beyond the simply anthropocentric view. Today, the existence of laws about the treatment of animals is one form of outgrowth of theories like Leopold’s.

Two matters are important to note at this point about global climate change and the ethics involved in efforts to mitigate it and its effects. First, the idea of speaking for the Earth as a whole is one strategy that has been appealed to in ethics. Environmental ethics scholar J. Baird Callicott (1994) has on several occasions argued, however, that it is quite certain that the Earth itself will be here whatever human beings do to it. Thus, the strategy of arguing for the Earth’s sake, an approach that Callicott claims to be too diffuse to be practical in inspiring people, is also misguided in a greater sense. The people who would argue for human-centered values in ethics are not taking the wrong track. It is life on Earth, including human life, which will be affected substantially by things like climate change. Thus, it is not problematic to focus on the values of environmental efforts that are based on the quality of human life and the cares of human beings.

Following Callicott’s advice, whether one believes in the independent theory of environmental value or only the anthropocentric theory, it seems most rhetorically powerful not only to argue according to human interests but to expand how people think of these. Philosopher Andrew Light has taken this approach, for example (Light 2002). One might differ from Leopold in how to defend things like unique fish in a river that could be destroyed due to some construction change or industrial practice and might instead consider the possible effects of such changes for human beings. One way to think of human interest with regard to generally unfamiliar animals or environments has been studied under the category of “ecosystem services” (Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Among the effects that have been considered in arguing for the defense of ecosystems are the kinds of benefits that come from biological diversity. The first among these is the fact that animals serve as food for other animals. As such, then, when one species is wiped out, it almost invariably has a rippling effect on other species, who either have to change their diets substantially, sometimes failing and thus dying out also, or to bring a substantial shift in effect on other animals that then become prey, potentially wiping them out. The number of animals and species affected can be enormous, then, from one simple change in biodiversity in a particular environment. When one realizes the breadth of possible effects from climate change, the results could be truly catastrophic (Gardiner 2004). The idea of “ecosystem services” points out the fact that humans get things like clean drinking water from a whole ecosystem. When people affect a significant element of an ecosystem, a great chain of events can mean danger for human beings as well as the animals and environments initially altered.

The skeptic could ask, however, what it matters if an ecosystem changes substantially, beyond the occasional cases in which things like drinking water are affected. What practical consequences are there for human beings in other cases? The first answer here would be that human beings enjoy their environments. Change to those environments could easily affect human beings negatively, therefore. Examples include changes for simple appreciation of beautiful environments that become less beautiful – the element of aesthetics in ethics. When one’s landscape is beautiful and valuable as such, one’s property values decrease significantly if the environments become less beautiful and desirable, which is a financial aspect of an aesthetic change. Another aesthetic change similarly can occur for hunters, who are no longer able to enjoy either their hunting environments or the animals that they hunt because of effects on populations due to environmental changes. As mentioned above, Leopold was a hunter too, who enjoyed environments as he respected their inherent value at the same time.

A second consequence could be agricultural. When an animal is eliminated that would otherwise keep insects in check, crops can be devastated all of a sudden because the insects are more able to multiply in huge numbers. Famines can result from such changes, if crops become devastated. The costs of shifts in agriculture are more immediately obvious for human interests. They can also be direr for human beings than aesthetic changes. In relation to issues of climate change, whatever the cause of changes in climates, farmers have begun to report the need to change the kinds of crops that they farm because of environmental changes. According to Mendelsohn,

The largest known economic impact of climate change is upon agriculture because of the size and sensitivity of the sector. Warming causes the greatest harm to agriculture in developing countries primarily because many farms in the low latitudes already endure climates that are too hot… Even though adaptation will blunt some of the worst predicted outcomes, warming is expected to cause large damages to agriculture in developing countries over the next century. (Mendelsohn 2009, p. 5)

Agriculture, economies, and food supplies are each threatened by changes in climate, therefore. So, when confronting problems in ethics for climate change, cost and benefit analyses of action surely bear weighty elements for consideration. At the same time, the people who are affected by these costs are important to consider. The point here at first, however, has simply been to show that one does not abandon consideration of environmental problems when one takes the impacts on human beings of things like climate change as essential sources of value for decision making. After all, those who care deeply about the value of a certain species alone need to make their cases in ethical debates with human beings, who bring their interests to the table. The strength for such persons, however, in the process is the profound impact on people that changes in environments can have.

Persons Who Experience Benefits and Costs

The subject of who is affected by changes in climate is important to consider. There is an intensely complex set of conflicting interests involved in considerations of who is affected by climate change and by efforts to mitigate it. The tradition in ethics has nearly always been to consider first and foremost the values and effects on persons who are presently living when debating the costs and benefits of action or of constraints on freedom. In the case of climate change, there certainly are people who are affected in the present through changes in things like aesthetics, hunting, and agriculture, as outlined in the previous section. For example, rivers that are drying up and that had attracted animals in some countries now no longer bring them, which affects agriculture and a vast number of organisms, in turn affecting food supply and economies for human beings (Mendelsohn 2009).

At the same time, some of the greatest potential worries about climate change are expected to come in the next few generations, not in the present. Thus, when it comes to ethics, an important question arises concerning the nature of present human beings’ responsibilities to future generations. After all, the people to whom some say living human beings have obligations are not even here today. They have not yet been born. How can people alive today have moral obligations to nonexistent people? The Stern Review (Stern 2007) has generated fairly profound impact on this subject, and the basic arguments have been summarized by the editors of Scientific American:

• Future generations will suffer most of the harmful effects of global climate change. Yet if the world economy grows, they will be richer than we are.

• The present generation must decide, with the help of expert advice from economists, whether to aggressively reduce the chances of future harm or to let our richer descendants largely fend for themselves.

• Economists cannot avoid making ethical choices in formulating their advices.

• Even the small chance of utter catastrophe from global warming raises special problems for ethical discussion (Broome 2008, p. 97).

There are a number of practices already observable that offer examples to follow regarding these questions of responsibilities to generations that are not present. First, when persons die, in most societies, people honor obligations to persons who have passed away. Part of the reason for this has to do with legal codes, and part of it has to do with resolving conflict among the living about those who die. But there are ways in which people honor those who have died in various ways, such as with memorials.

What is more interesting for the present issue of debate has to do with future generations. With regard to them, politicians in recent years, such as Senator John McCain, have argued for clear obligations to children and grandchildren in the United States. McCain argues that accruing debt today is wrong because of the negative effect it will have on future generations, who will be “saddled” with debt (McCain 2009). In these instances, politicians like McCain raise problems about the national debt and the deficits that cause it to grow. What deficits do is to increase the country’s future financial obligations to pay back loans incurred for the purpose of present spending. Those who defend such spending argue that there are long-term effects of such spending, such as in rebuilding an economy that can pay back the debts and avoid greater recessions or another depression. At the same time, then, both sides of the debate about rising deficits are making claims about moral obligations both to present and future citizens. The claim some detractors make about government spending is that it is irresponsible, it is wrong, to create negative future financial circumstances for future generations – children, their children, and their children after that. The argument goes that people have obligations to their children’s grandchildren. Such ideas are not farfetched, and they can be seen clearly to apply to matters of environmental ethics.

Those who would reject obligations to future generations make quite a controversial claim. The more common line would be by analogy to the idea of proximity. In some ethical circumstances, it seems quite clear, for instance, that people have obligations to help someone if they can when that person is close and is in great pain. If people can help and choose not to do so, they allow greater suffering to continue than would occur if they were to intervene. Thus, in the view of some moral philosophers, people are partly responsible for the outcome that ensues from inaction. Even inaction has effects, in other words. The key point here is that one may have an obligation to help someone drowning 15 ft away, but the person who is drowning a mile away is someone either who cannot be helped or who is not sufficiently proximal. A better example is starvation, since it is not quite as immediate a problem. If someone nearby is starving and so someone is far away, people have a tendency to think that either the person close to them is the one for whom they have the greater obligation or it is the person with the greater pain. When all things are equal regarding the extent of the suffering, people perhaps naturally feel a greater obligation to those who are closest to them. Translate this trend that is here described spatially to the temporal level and the same pattern seems to hold. If people are starving today, human beings seem to have a far greater moral obligation to them than to address the starvation of possible people who may or may not come to be born tomorrow or in several generations. This at least is the set of options for considering obligations to people present and in the future. The common motivation for taking present and close persons to be more important is understandable, therefore, all things equal, compared with people who are not present or close. The trouble is, however, that the future which is put on hold in moral consideration could be deeply affected by choices that provide only small benefits or pose only small costs today. In fiscal terms, consider the US Congress throwing an incredible national party at enormous expense to future generations. It may be fun, but the benefits would be short-lived and appear incredibly thoughtless to future generations who then have to suffer the burdens of an inconsiderate earlier society. When it comes to ethics and climate change, it is hard to think that people have no obligation to future generations. There are also long-term predictions that appear quite worrisome given the apparent increase in the rates of temperature rise and other factors relevant to climate change. Thus, policymakers must think about the environmental crisis that future generations might have to face, much as they already consider the problem of passing on debt to future generations of children and grandchildren.

Beyond the problems of obligations for present and future persons is the fact that the costs and benefits of constraints on freedom and of positive action regarding climate change mitigation are disconnected. In other words, the persons who are affected by costs are rarely the same people who reap benefits. The following are three important examples of this idea.

The first example concerns persons currently affected by climate change. Consider the farmers who presently have to change their crops or who have lost their crops and the potential to raise them. Whether climate change can be attributed clearly to the production of greenhouse gases or not, the persons who are benefiting from greenhouse gas consumption the most, especially the recipients of wealth that come as a result, or at least the persons most likely to pay the costs of action about climate change, typically the wealthier nations, are either going to lose some of the benefits they get or incur some of the costs of the response to climate change mitigation when they themselves are to a far less devastating extent affected by the change in climate. In this sense, then, climate change is something unlikely to be addressed in profound ways by individuals acting only in their own self-interest, at least until sufficient problems occur to bring about a serious threat for the wealthier nations and persons. In this sense, then, the disconnection in present time is a real problem for bringing about one kind of response to climate change mitigation. It makes it far more likely that any real effort to address climate change will take place primarily at the state (national) level or through channels for which there is private benefit for making changes, which might include, for instance, the development of energy-efficient technologies that get sold for profit.

Another similar disconnect occurs at the level of present and future people. While future consequences can only be addressed by present people at any given time, benefits in equations of cost and benefit can seem less weighty because future people are not present. As such, then, the people who will make the sacrifice for future generations are present and feel less the impulse to help those whom they cannot see. This entails the idea of discounting the future. The problem occurs in many spheres. When roads are unsafe but are costly to change, it often takes catastrophe in terms of loss of life for people to feel sufficiently motivated to bring about change. The same problem occurs for issues of fiscal discipline. Also, the arguments against present action in favor, for instance, of allowing present businesses to continue unhampered in their practices that promote climate change see importance in the effects of changes to economic success as ripples. In other words, greater constraint on economic growth now can have negative effects on future generations also. The matter of who is affected by climate change and efforts to mitigate it is quite complicated, therefore, and is most likely to occur at the larger, state level or at the level of vast agreements for changes that are established with cooperation between government and industry.

A further disconnect is important to notice in considering who will be affected by constraints on the production of greenhouse gases or other efforts to mitigate climate change. Poor nations argue that limitations on their industries are limitations on their development. In other words, when burning fuels like coal is the cheaper energy route that makes places like China and India grow, they argue that to push them not to use such fuels is unfair in terms of market competition. They argue that the United States and other such wealthy nations that industrialized first would perpetuate poverty in poor nations for the sake of environmental concerns, when poor countries’ development needs are great. Therefore, the people affected by efforts to change industries, practices, and efforts that mitigate climate change not only concern poor farmers and wealthy nations but also those nations seeking economic growth out of poverty. They wish for the freedom to develop in ways that will bring masses of people out of poverty, raising the standard of living for human beings in poor places. The result of making allowances for such cases, however, is that those nations who accept responsibility to act for the sake of mitigating climate change may argue, with debatable merit, that double standards are hypocritical. These kinds of problems and arguments demonstrate how difficult it is and will be to create significant coalitions in efforts to mitigate climate change. The web of conflicting interests involved renders the problem of laying out a simple ethic of environmental action enormously difficult. The motivation for clarifying these issues, however, is powerful nonetheless, since the potential harm to humanity of inaction could be catastrophic. Incredibly complex circumstances have been resolved before, but only with great effort and time. The effort and time spent to date in climate change have yet to resolve these issues.

New Developments

With still so much to be developed about the future of climate change, adaptation options, and potential methods of mitigation, the ethical responsibilities involved may take shape in a variety of ways. An important shift has occurred since the start of the environmental movement. That shift is cultural. A movement has taken hold to consider future steps for addressing environmental problems. Early on in the environmental movement, there was far less study of environmental science than is available today. Cultural elements like the development of recycling systems have become commonplace in countless population centers worldwide. Plus, what started as an apparently politically polarized concern for the environment has grown to be recognized in many spheres. Just one example of this is in sanitation. It is clear to people that the faster landfills fill up, for instance, the sooner new costs will come for more land, farther carrying of trash at greater fuel expenses, etc. Also, in communities with well-run recycling efforts, municipalities can see financial benefit from the materials recycled that would otherwise just fill up landfills. These elements I call cultural because they are not measures that address climate change directly. Rather, they are elements of a culture of consideration for what it means to be a part of an ecosystem today.

At one level, something like a cultural shift is necessary, since no one solution is likely to resolve the problems of climate change. Andrew Light’s environmental pragmatism suggests an effort to move beyond traditional philosophical debates about the nature of environmental value. He argued that “the important thing to impress upon environmental philosophers [is] the need to take up the largely empirical question of what morally motivates human to change their attitudes, behaviors, and policy preferences toward those more supportive of long-term environmental sustainability” (Light 2002, p. 446). What is most likely is that a variety of efforts combined will be necessary to bring about both the will for change and the consequent support for public policy that addresses environmental concern adequately. Those efforts should include both adaptation and some potential measures of mitigation, and these will inescapably have to be joined with developments in new technologies whose benefits should bring about a decrease in harmful emissions, a decrease in demand for finite energy resources, and an increase in sustainable practices. These joint goals do not yet have a singular solution for achieving them all, but together they embody the various important elements that will enable cultural shifts in energy use and thus emissions to take hold in wealthier nations and abroad. But the problems of climate change may require drastic action in some regions, and with any drastic action, costs arise, both in carrying out the action and in dealing with its new effects. The most effective outcomes will likely occur with the help of interdisciplinary teams working in concert to bring about maximally beneficial environmental results, such as are starting to arise with projects like architectural planning for new buildings. Even if changes come, yielding a culture of concern for the environment, however, some new developments in ethics and in climate change considerations will grow increasingly important and complex and will continue to challenge cultural beliefs and practices. These include the following:

• The need for new technologies, such as trapping of GHG’s, and energy efficiencies

• The possible need for population controls and the conflicts that will likely arise regarding fairness and freedom in relation to such controls

• Policies and plans for the future migrations of people who have no other choice

• Challenges of dividing up responsibilities when changes require costs

• The offset of cost involved in choosing practices that are sustainable over ones that are simpler and cheaper, but at greater environmental cost

A final consideration is worth noting. There are regions in which people do not yet live. In those places, there are natural resources that could be gathered. Among these circumstances is the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in the United States, which has been at the center of controversy about drilling for oil in new locations. People argue that America ought to exploit this location since no one uses it. A few considerations already mentioned combine in rendering such cases more complex. For instance, it could be claimed that such areas will not have future benefit for people because people do not travel there. As climate changes, however, it is altogether possible that uninhabitable places become inhabitable. In that process, places like refuges near the poles will become more frequented as a result of the thawing of cold regions, but it is uncertain whether or not future generations will make use of such refuges. In this instance, then, the problem of uncertainty for the future returns, while not directing specific action – since people must not commit the fallacy of appealing to ignorance – it is important nevertheless to raise the question about whether it is true that the ANWR will not be used in the future. Also, it appears that climate change, while potentially devastating in some regions, may bring benefit to colder regions to some degree. Finally, the matter of responsibilities to future generations arises, when coupled with these first two considerations, showing concern for children and grandchildren, who may 1 day frequent places like the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Nevertheless, the people of today need to be concerned about sources of energy, as well as their economic well-being, for without the necessary financial and energy resources, expensive efforts to mitigate climate change will be impossible.

Conclusion

Changes in climate are of the immensely complex sort that will require consideration about a vast array of responsibilities and inputs. This fact has slowed the development of a culture of environmental concern, but today that culture is building and appears to recognize more than ever before the need for concerted efforts to get ready for the greater changes and costs that climate change will bring about. For the present volume on climate change mitigation, the focus has been on terminology, options for mitigation, as well as the various ways of thinking and the considerations that should be taken into account for ethical approaches to human conduct about climate change. At the same time, in the cost and benefit analyses to be used in evaluation of the various methods that are and will become available for responding to new problems, it is important to factor in options for adaptation to new circumstances, remaining as open as possible to intelligent deliberation about the ideal resolution of the problems of climate change. People must also take into account the fact that measures to mitigate climate change always come with costs of their own, both direct and indirect. The fact that there are costs to the work of addressing climate change, however, ought not to be seen as implying that the world would lose equally from action as from inaction. Climate science, mitigation strategies, and projections of adaptation options, all are becoming better understood as further inquiry develops into these areas. Skepticism is often a healthy force in inspiring further study and justification for public action. Past skepticism has inspired more and more study over time, which appears to be converging on the conclusion that the need for action must be taken seriously and proposals weighed. This chapter has been aimed at exposing readers to a number of issues related to a broad understanding of climate change, mitigation, and the moral norms that ought to be taken into account as international efforts are shaped to address the future of the global climate.