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Loan Contract Terms

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Encyclopedia of Finance
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Abstract

Loan contract terms refer to the price and nonprice terms associated with a corporate loan deal between a borrower and a lender or a syndicate of lenders. The specification of loan contract terms differs across loans. These differences are attributable to the tradeoffs between values of loan contract terms that the borrower chooses when negotiating the loan contract, as well as the purpose of the loan and borrower and lending syndicate characteristics. Methodological issues that arise when investigating the relations between loan contract terms include allowing for loan contract terms that are determined simultaneously and accurately estimating credit risk.

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Correspondence to Aron A. Gottesman .

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Gottesman, A.A. (2013). Loan Contract Terms. In: Lee, CF., Lee, A. (eds) Encyclopedia of Finance. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5360-4_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5360-4_15

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