Encyclopedia of Creativity, Invention, Innovation and Entrepreneurship

2013 Edition
| Editors: Elias G. Carayannis

Patents and Entrepreneurship

  • Julien Pénin
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-3858-8_416


 Innovation policy;  Intellectual property rights;  Markets for technology;  Open innovation;  R&D collaboration

A patent gives to its owner an exclusive right on a product or process which is new, inventive, and has an industrial application (in the USA, this third criterion is broader in the sense that the invention needs not to have an industrial application but must merely be useful). From a legal point of view, a patent is a negative right. It gives the right to exclude but not necessarily to use an invention, if this use leads to infringe a right held by someone else. The maximum duration of the patent protection is 20 years after the first application (but a majority of patents does not last this long). Also, in most countries, patent applicants must provide a description of their invention which, 18 months after the first application, is made public (made available to everybody). The description must be sufficiently clear and exhaustive in order to allow a person...

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media LLC 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Strasbourg – BETA (UMR 7522 CNRS-UdS)Strasbourg CedexFrance