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Dynamic Games with an Application to Climate Change Models

  • Reference work entry
Computational Complexity

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Article Outline

Glossary

Definition of the Subject

Introduction

The Dynamic – or Stochastic – Game Model

The Dynamic – or Stochastic – Game: Results

Global Climate Change – Issues, Models

Global Climate Change – Results

Future Directions

Bibliography

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Abbreviations

Players :

The agents who take actions. These actions can be – depending on application – the choice of capital stock, greenhouse emissions, level of savings, level of Research & Development expenditures, price level, quality and quantity of effort, etc.

Strategies :

Full contingent plans for the actions that players take. Each strategy incorporates a choice of action not just once but rather a choice of action for every possible decision node for the player concerned.

Payoffs :

The utility or returns to a player from playing a game. These payoffs typically depend on the strategies chosen – and the consequent actions taken – by the player herself as well as those chosen by the other players in the game.

Game horizon :

The length of time over which the game is played, i. e., over which the players take actions. The horizon may be finite – if there are only a finite number of opportunities for decision‐making – or infinite – when there are an infinite number of decision‐making opportunities.

Equilibrium :

A vector of strategies, one for each player in the game, such that no player can unilaterally improve her payoffs by altering her strategy, if the others' strategies are kept fixed.

Climate change :

The consequence to the earth's atmosphere of economic activities such as the production and consumption of energy that result in a build-up of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York, USA

    Prajit K. Dutta

Authors
  1. Prajit K. Dutta
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. RAMTECH LIMITED, 122 Escalle Lane, Larkspur, CA, 94939, USA

    Robert A. Meyers Ph. D. (Editor-in-Chief) (Editor-in-Chief)

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag

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Dutta, P.K. (2012). Dynamic Games with an Application to Climate Change Models. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Computational Complexity. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_58

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