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Zero-Sum Two Person Games

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Computational Complexity

Article Outline

Introduction

Games with Perfect Information

Mixed Strategy and Minimax Theorem

Behavior Strategies in Games with Perfect Recall

Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies

General Minimax Theorems

Applications of Infinite Games

Epilogue

Acknowledgment

Bibliography

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Acknowledgment

The author wishes to acknowledge the unknown referee's detailed comments in the revision of the first draft. More importantly he drew theauthor's attention to the topic of search games and other combinatorial games. The author would like to thank Ms. Patricia Collins for her assistance inher detailed editing of the first draft of this manuscript. The author owes special thanks to Mr. Ramanujan Raghavan and Dr. A.V. Lakshmi Narayanan fortheir help in incorporating the the graphics drawings into the LaTeX file.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science, University of Illinois, Chicago, USA

    T.E.S. Raghavan

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  1. T.E.S. Raghavan
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. RAMTECH LIMITED, 122 Escalle Lane, Larkspur, CA, 94939, USA

    Robert A. Meyers Ph. D. (Editor-in-Chief) (Editor-in-Chief)

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Raghavan, T. (2012). Zero-Sum Two Person Games. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Computational Complexity. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_209

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