Article Outline
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
Nash Equilibrium
Existence
Mixed Strategies
Equilibrium in Beliefs
Correlated Equilibrium
Rationality, Correlated Equilibrium and Equilibrium in Beliefs
Bayesian Games
Evolutionary Stable Strategies
Future Directions
Bibliography
Keywords
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- Player:
-
A participant in a game.
- Action set:
-
The set of actions that a player may choose.
- Action profile:
-
A list of actions, one for each player.
- Payoff:
-
The utility a player obtains from a given action profile.
Bibliography
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Volij, O. (2012). Static Games. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Computational Complexity. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_188
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_188
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