Article Outline
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
The Model
Equilibrium
The Basic Model
Cheap Talk
Verifiable Information
Communication About Intentions
Applications
Future Directions
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
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- Babbling equilibrium:
-
An equilibrium in which the sender's strategy is independent of type and the receiver's strategy is independent of signal.
- Behavior strategy:
-
A strategy for an extensive‐form game that specifies the probability of taking each action at each information set.
- Behavioral type:
-
A player in a game who is constrained to follow a given strategy.
- Cheap-talk game:
-
A signaling game in which players' preferences do not depend directly on signals.
- Condition D1:
-
An equilibrium refinement that requires out-of‐equilibrium beliefs to be supported on types that have the most to gain from deviating from a fixed equilibrium.
- Divinity:
-
An equilibrium refinement that requires out-of‐equilibrium beliefs to place relatively more weight on types that gain more from deviating from a fixed equilibrium.
- Equilibrium outcome:
-
The probability distribution over terminal nodes in a game determined by equilibrium strategy.
- Handicap principle:
-
The idea that animals communicate fitness through observable characteristics that reduce fitness.
- Incomplete information game:
-
A game in which players lack information about the strategy sets or payoff functions of their opponents.
- Intuitive criterion:
-
An equilibrium refinement that requires out-of‐equilibrium beliefs to place zero weight on types that can never gain from deviating from a fixed equilibrium outcome.
- Nash equilibrium:
-
A strategy profile in a game in which each player's strategy is a best response to the equilibrium strategies of the other players.
- Neologism‐proof equilibrium:
-
An equilibrium that admits no self‐signaling set.
- Pooling equilibrium:
-
A signaling‐game equilibrium in which each all sender types send the same signal with probability one.
- Receiver:
-
In a signaling game, the uninformed player.
- Self‐signaling set:
-
A set of types C with the property that precisely types in the set C gain from inducing the best response to C relative to a fixed equilibrium.
- Sender:
-
In a signaling game, the informed agent.
- Separating equilibrium:
-
A signaling‐game equilibrium in which sender types sent signals from disjoint subsets of the set of available signals.
- Signaling game:
-
A two‐player game of incomplete information in which one player is informed and the other in not. The informed player's strategy is a type‐contingent message and the uninformed player's strategy is a message‐continent action.
- Single‐crossing condition:
-
A condition that guarantees that indifferent curves from a given family of preferences cross at most one.
- Spence‐Mirrlees condition:
-
A differential condition that orders the slopes of level sets of a function.
- Standard signaling game:
-
A signaling game in which strategy sets and payoff functions satisfy monotonicity properties.
- Type:
-
In an incomplete information game, a variable that summarizes private information.
- Verifiable information game:
-
A signaling game with the property that each type has a signal that can only be sent by that type.
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Acknowledgments
I thank the Guggenheim Foundation, NSF, and the Secretaría de Estado de Universidades e Investigación delMinisterio de Educación y Ciencia (Spain) for financial support and Jose Penalva for his comments. I am grateful to the Departament d'Economiai d'Història Econòmica and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona for hospitality and administrativesupport.
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Sobel, J. (2012). Signaling Games. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Computational Complexity. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_174
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