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Inspection Games

  • Reference work entry
Computational Complexity

Article Outline

Glossary

Definition

Introduction

Selected Inspection Models

Future Directions

Bibliography

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Abbreviations

Noncooperative game :

An n‑person noncooperative game in normal or strategic form is a list of actions, called pure strategies, for each of n players, together with a rule for specifying each player's payoff (utility) when every player has chosen a specific action. Each player seeks to maximize her own payoff.

Mixed strategy :

A mixed strategy for a player in a noncooperative game is a probability distribution over that player's pure strategies.

Extensive form:

The extensive form of a noncooperative game is a graphical representation which describes a succession of moves by different players, including chance moves, and which can handle quite intricate information patterns.

Zero‐sum game :

A zero-sum game is a noncooperative game in which the payoffs of all players sum to zero for any specific combination of pure strategies.

Nash equilibrium :

A Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative game is a specification of strategies for all players with the property that no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from her specified strategy. A solution of a noncooperative game is a Nash equilibrium which is either unique, or which, for some reason, has been selected among alternative equilibria.

Saddle point :

A saddle point is a Nash equilibrium of a two‐person zero‐sum game. The value of the game is the (unique) equilibrium payoff to the first player.

Utility :

Utilities are sequences of numbers assigned to the outcomes of any strategy combination which mirror the order of preferences of each player and which fulfill the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern.

Deterrence :

In an inspection game, deterrence is said to be achieved by a Nash equilibrium in which the inspectee behaves legally, or in accordance with the agreed rule.

Inspector leadership :

Leadership in inspection games is a strategic concept by which, through persuasive announcement of her strategy, the inspector can achieve deterrence.

Verification :

Verification is the independent confirmation by an inspector of the information reported by an inspectee. It is used most commonly in the context of arms control and disarmament agreements.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Armed Forces University Munich, Neubiberg, Germany

    Rudolf Avenhaus

  2. Institute for Chemistry and Dynamics of the Geosphere, Forschungszentrum Jülich, Jülich, Germany

    Morton J. Canty

Authors
  1. Rudolf Avenhaus
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  2. Morton J. Canty
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. RAMTECH LIMITED, 122 Escalle Lane, Larkspur, CA, 94939, USA

    Robert A. Meyers Ph. D. (Editor-in-Chief) (Editor-in-Chief)

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Avenhaus, R., Canty, M.J. (2012). Inspection Games. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Computational Complexity. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_103

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