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Encyclopedia of Systems and Control pp 1–6Cite as

Evolutionary Games

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Abstract

Evolutionary games constitute the most recent major mathematical tool for understanding, modelling and predicting evolution in biology and other fields. They complement other well establlished tools such as branching processes and the Lotka-Volterra (1910) equations (e.g. for the predator - prey dynamics or for epidemics evolution). Evolutionary Games also brings novel features to game theory. First, it focuses on the dynamics of competition rather than restricting attention to the equilibrium. In particular, it tries to explain how an equilibrium emerges. Second, it brings new definitions of stability, that are more adapted to the context of large populations. Finally, in contrast to standard game theory, players are not assumed to be “rational” or “knowledgeable” as to anticipate the other players’ choices. The objective of this article, is to present foundations as well as recent advances in evolutionary games, highlight the novel concepts that they introduce with respect to game theory as formulated by John Nash, and describe through several examples their huge potential as tools for modeling interactions in complex systems.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. INRIA, Sophia-Antipolis, France

    Eitan Altman

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  1. Eitan Altman
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Correspondence to Eitan Altman .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Electrical and Computer Engineering, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA

    John Baillieul

  2. Automation and Control Solutions, Honeywell, Golden Valley, Minnesota, USA

    Tariq Samad

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© 2013 Springer-Verlag London

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Altman, E. (2013). Evolutionary Games. In: Baillieul, J., Samad, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Systems and Control. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_32-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_32-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, London

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-5102-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference EngineeringReference Module Computer Science and Engineering

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