Abstract
Mechanism design is concerned with the design of strategic environments to achieve desired outcomes at equilibria of the resulting game. We briefly overview central ideas in mechanism design. We survey both objectives the mechanism designer may seek to achieve, as well as equilibrium concepts the designer may use to model agents. We conclude by discussing a seminal example of mechanism design at work: the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms.
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Johari, R. (2015). Mechanism Design. In: Baillieul, J., Samad, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Systems and Control. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5058-9_38
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5058-9_38
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Publisher Name: Springer, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-4471-5057-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-5058-9
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