Encyclopedia of Systems and Control

2015 Edition
| Editors: John Baillieul, Tariq Samad

Mechanism Design

  • Ramesh Johari
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5058-9_38

Abstract

Mechanism design is concerned with the design of strategic environments to achieve desired outcomes at equilibria of the resulting game. We briefly overview central ideas in mechanism design. We survey both objectives the mechanism designer may seek to achieve, as well as equilibrium concepts the designer may use to model agents. We conclude by discussing a seminal example of mechanism design at work: the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms.

Keywords

Game theory Incentive compatibility Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ramesh Johari
    • 1
  1. 1.Stanford UniversityStanfordUSA