Abstract
Auctions are procedures for selling one or more items to one or more bidders. Auctions induce games among the bidders, so notions of equilibrium from game theory can be applied to auctions. Auction theory aims to characterize and compare the equilibrium outcomes for different types of auctions. Combinatorial auctions arise when multiple-related items are sold simultaneously.
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© 2015 Springer-Verlag London
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Hajek, B. (2015). Auctions. In: Baillieul, J., Samad, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Systems and Control. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5058-9_36
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5058-9_36
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Print ISBN: 978-1-4471-5057-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-5058-9
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