Abstract
Within modern economic analysis, early recognition of the importance of agency problems goes back to at least Marschak (1955), Arrow (1963) and Pauly (1968). These early works are followed by the classical contributions of Mirrlees (1975), Holmstrom (1979), Shavell (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Anderlini, L. and Felli, L. 1998. Describability and agency problems. European Economic Review 42, 35–59.
Arrow, K. 1963. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review 53, 941–73.
Besley, T. and Ghatak, M. 2005. Competition and incentives with motivated agents. American Economic Review 95, 616–36.
Bolton, P. and Dewatripont, M. 2005. Contract Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Eliaz, K. and Spiegler, R. 2006. Contracting with diversely naive agents. Review of Economic Studies 73, 689–714.
Fudenberg, D., Holmström, B. and Milgrom, P. 1990. Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships. Journal of Economic Theory 51, 1–31.
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. 1983. An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica 51, 7–45.
Hellwig, M. and Schmidt, K. 2002. Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision. Econometrica 70, 2225–64.
Holmström, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 74–91.
Holmström, B. and Milgrom, P. 1987. Aggregation and linearity in provision of intertemporal incentives. Econometrica 55, 303–328.
Holmström, B. and Milgrom, P. 1991. Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 7, 24–52.
Holmström, B. and Milgrom, P. 1994. The firm as an incentive system. American Economic Review 84, 972–91.
Jewitt, I. 1988. Justifying the first-order approach to principal-agent problems. Econometrica 56, 1177–1190.
Laffont, J.-J. and Martimort, D. 2002. The Theory of Incentives. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Malcomson, J. and Spinnewyn, F. 1988. The multiperiod principal-agent problem. Review of Economic Studies 55, 391–407.
Marschak, J. 1955. Elements for a theory of teams. Management Science 1, 127–37.
Maskin, E. and Tirole, J. 1990. The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal: the case of private values. Econometrica 58, 379–409.
Maskin, E. and Tirole, J. 1992. The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal II: common values. Econometrica 60, 1–42.
Mirrlees, J. 1975. The theory of moral hazard and unobservable behavior: part I. Mimeo, Nuffield College, Oxford University. Published in Review of Economic Studies 66 (1999), 3–21.
Myerson, R. 1983. Mechanism design by an informed principal. Econometrica 51, 1767–98.
O’Donoghue, T. and Rabin, M. 2005. Incentives and self control. Mimeo, University of California, Berkeley.
Pauly, M. 1968. The economics of moral hazard. American Economic Review 58, 531–37.
Rey, P. and Salanié, B. 1990. Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: on the value of commitment in contracting. Econometrica 58, 597–619.
Rogerson, W. 1985. The first-order approach to principal-agent problems. Econometrica 53, 1357–67.
Salanié, B. 2000. The Economics of Contracts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Shavell, S. 1979. On moral hazard and insurance. Quarterly Journal of Economics 93, 541–62.
Editor information
Copyright information
© 2008 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
About this entry
Cite this entry
Anderlini, L., Felli, L. (2008). Agency Problems. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-58802-2_15
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-58802-2_15
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-78676-5
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-58802-2