Bidding models have been constructed to help bidders decide how to bid, to help auction designers evaluate alternative rules and formats, and to help detect collusion. The models date back at least to 1956 when work that led to the first PhD in Operations Research was published by Friedman. Early applications were to help bidders in oil lease and construction bidding. Beginning in the late 1970s, there has been a surge of new theoretical work, much of it involving game theory models. Game-theoretic analysis has influence the design of auctions for FCC spectrum. The results of applying bidding models are known to be quite sensitive to the choice of modeling assumptions.
There are various types of auctions. Some bidding models have been constructed to analyze bidding in a particular type of auction, while others are intended to compare results across various types. The main types of auctions are:
- 1.)
Standard sealed bidding in which the best bid wins and the sale price is the amount of...
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Rothkopf, M.H. (2001). BIDDING MODELS . In: Gass, S.I., Harris, C.M. (eds) Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-0611-X_71
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-0611-X_71
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