Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory

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| Editors: Michael A. Peters

C. S. Peirce’s Abduction, Induction, and Deduction

  • Lucia Santaella BragaEmail author
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_575-1

If C. S. Peirce had only developed his triad of reasoning and arguments – abduction, induction, and deduction – and the consequences of this triad for his renewed conception of science and its methods, that would have been enough to guarantee his fame in the future. In fact, his abductive logic constitutes an extremely original contribution to heuristic studies and his conception of induction and even of deduction also brings traces of originality.

Peirce’s work starts from phenomenology. The whole of his work is rooted in his three categories which, over time, he emptied of any contents, parallel to the development of his logic of relations, calling them firstness, secondness, and thirdness. Peirce’s doctrine of signs or semiotics is entirely based on the three categories, and there is no way to understand the subtleties of its innumerable definitions and classifications of signs without a careful knowledge of phenomenology. With this doctrine of signs also called speculative grammar,...

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Pontifical Catholic University of São PauloSão PauloBrazil

Section editors and affiliations

  • Torill Strand
    • 1
  • Catherine W. Legg
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EducationUniversity of OsloOsloNorway
  2. 2.Philosophy ProgramDeakin UniversityBurwoodAustralia