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Maschinenethik und Philosophie

  • Catrin Misselhorn
Living reference work entry
First Online:
Part of the Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften book series (SPREFGEIST)

Zusammenfassung

Die Maschinenethik ist ein Forschungsgebiet an der Schnittstelle von Philosophie und Informatik. Dieser Beitrag beschäftigt sich zum einen mit den philosophischen Grundbegriffen und Voraussetzungen der Maschinenethik. Diese sind von besonderer Bedeutung, da sie Fragen aufwerfen, die die Möglichkeit der Maschinenethik teilweise grundsätzlich in Zweifel ziehen. Zum zweiten werden die verschiedenen Rollen der Philosophie auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen innerhalb der Maschinenethik thematisiert und die methodologische Umsetzung dieses interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms dargelegt.

Schlüsselwörter

Artificial Morality Artificial Moral Agent (AMA) KI Moralisches Handeln Bewusstsein Intentionalität Willensfreiheit Moralimplementation Forschungsprogramm der Maschinenethik Ethische Bewertung der Maschinenethik 
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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Lehrstuhl für Wissenschaftstheorie und TechnikphilosophieInstitut für Philosophie der Universität StuttgartStuttgartDeutschland

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