• Philip T. HoffmanEmail author
Living reference work entry


Institutions clearly play a major role in economic growth and political development. But much more needs to be done to verify and to clarify their role, and to show that it is causal, and not the result of other factors. The necessary work will involve careful historical research, the assembly of large data sets, and careful econometrics and formal modeling. And it should also involve cooperation with other social scientists, from experimental economics to anthropology and political science.


Institutions Economic growth Politics Property rights Political science Culture Glorious Revolution Douglass North Political economy 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.California Institute of Technology (CalTech)PasadenaUSA

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