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Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science pp 1–19Cite as

Social Choice Theory

  • Living reference work entry
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Glossary

Aggregation Rules :

These are methods that combine information about the preferences of agents in society and turn them into binary relations, interpreted as “collective preferences,” that may or may not inherit the properties of those attributed to individuals.

Arrow’s Impossibility theorem :

This pioneering result expresses the logical impossibility of aggregating individual transitive preferences into social transitive preferences, when a society faces more than two alternatives, while respecting the Arrowian conditions of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, Non-Dictatorship, Universal Domain, and Pareto.

Chaos theorems :

Cyclical patterns in social preferences arise in many cases, under a wide variety of aggregation rules. In multidimensional settings, where social alternatives can be identified with vectors of characteristics, chaos theorems prove that such cyclical patterns can emerge, even if individual preferences are restricted to be saturated and concave, in...

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  1. MOVE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Barcelona, Spain

    Salvador Barberà

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  1. Salvador Barberà
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Correspondence to Salvador Barberà .

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  1. Ramtech Ltd., Larkspur, CA, USA

    Robert A. Meyers

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Barberà, S. (2018). Social Choice Theory. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5_666-1

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