Professional Associations
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Definition
A professional association is a body of a knowledge-based group, whose main concern is the promotion of technical standards (Torstendahl 1990).
Anglo-American sociology of professions usually refers to professional associations as a sign of the maturity of a professional project (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933; Wilensky 1964; Larson 1979).
Classic references from the sociology of professions identify the existence of stages of professionalization. Professional associations may thus be conceived as a stage of professionalization among others, like the creation of specific training or the existence of a licence law and of an ethical code (Wilensky 1964).
Professional associations can also be understood as a strategy of an occupational group to strengthen its status, reducing conflicts among professionals and mobilizing resources (Selander 1990). This strategy usually tends to closure (Torstendahl 1990). In this sense, professional associations test the ability of members before they are admitted to practice, which involves an indirect control of their training, and, after their admission, they monitor standards by imposing the respect of an ethical code.
Introduction
There are few references on professional associations, particularly in civil society literature. This paucity of references was already noted in the 1930s by Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933). The research that does exist is analyzed under the general framework of sociology of professions/professional groups, where the main focus is professions and professionalization of occupations. Professional associations receive only indirect attention.
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The promotion of professional status and image, constructing the cultural identity of the professional group
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The certification of members’ training/education
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The monitoring of deontology, playing a disciplinary function
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The promotion of innovation by sponsoring knowledge-sharing and diffusion, through holding annual meetings, publishing a journal, giving opportunities for informal networking, etc. (Galaskiewicz 1985)
While public interest seems to be guaranteed by professional associations and can even be recognized by the state through a special statute, the monopoly of peer controls may turn these organizations into self-interest organizations. Autonomy and self-regulation can also be understood as a means to render professional services scarce, and services more expensive in consequence (Marshall 1939). In this sense, professional associations may be seen as corporative, and the authority of professional associations can conflict with administrative authority (Freidson 1994). Debate exists in the literature regarding this self-interest versus public interest. It is often difficult to separate public from self-interest in professional associations, as they act both altruistically and self-interestedly.
Professional associations may share strategies and pursue goals similar to other civil society associations, such as trade unions. Indeed, both professional associations and unions contribute to integration in a professional community and to the improvement of a profession’s status (Hovekamp 1997).
However, at least since Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933), the literature has stressed an incompatibility between professional associations and trade unions. There is a “principled rejection” of unions by white-collar employees (Larson 1979), because unions contribute to decrease rather than elevate professionals’ social status (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933), and because unions base their action in the conflict between people and institutions, while professional associations aim to integrate them (Hovekamp 1997).
Professional associations and trade unions also differ in that one purpose of professional associations is to cross class boundaries, controlling a field of work or a body of knowledge (diplomas, credentials, etc.), while the main purpose of trade unions is to negotiate wages and other working conditions for their members (Selander 1990). Consequently, reasons for joining are also distinct: in professional associations individuals look for the recognition of their expertise and autonomy of status, while in unions they mainly seek individual benefits (Hovekamp 1997).
Nevertheless, there are similarities. Professional associations protect the economic interests of their members, albeit indirectly, when they attempt to improve the image of the profession. Unions also stand for the profession’s image, namely by negotiating beyond bread-and-butter issues (Hovekamp 1997).
In the modern labor market, the purposes of professional associations and unions may become mixed in “hybrid organizations” (Wilensky 1964). There is also some evidence that professional associations are using trade union strategies (Torstendahl 1990). Due to the long-standing interaction between them, it seems they have influenced each other (Alexander 1980).
Historical Background
According to Durkheim (1973), the first signs of professional associations can be found in the occupational corporations of Ancient Rome. These corporations were grounded in religion and did not engage in public action. Administrative integration in the state led to their disappearance with the decline of the Roman Empire in the fifth century.
Some centuries later, occupational corporations emerged again with craft guilds. Guilds did not develop in all regions in Europe, but they became the main way of organizing work in many cities in Europe between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries (Krause 1996). The Middle Age was the “golden age of corporations” (Dubar 1991) because membership in an occupational corporation was a socially distinctive attribute. For Durkheim (1973), the reappearance of corporations demonstrates that they answer deep-seated and lasting moral needs: the subordination of individual to collective interests.
It is generally considered that the medieval guilds are predecessors to professional associations since they played a role in the community and established an occupational monopoly in order to protect members from the threats of markets. Unlike professional associations, guilds were religion-based and hierarchical in nature, access was dependent on hereditary criteria and they played a military role (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933; Kieser 1989).
The decline of medieval guilds in Europe around the end of the fifteenth century was essentially caused by their inability to adapt to functional specialization as well as the separation of individual motives from institutional goals (Kieser 1989). According to Freidson (1994), the most important difference between the modern professions and the crafts and earlier guilds lies in the way professions control innovation through the education system. Innovation and profit were against the guild spirit, which restricted their adaptability at a time when other organizations were following the principle of profit maximization with increasing rationality, e.g., factories were getting support from political power (Durkheim 1973; Kieser 1989). Even if there is an underlying association strategy in both medieval guilds and professional associations, they differ because occupations are not necessarily of the same nature. So, professional associations as known today are of recent creation.
The first professional associations were created in the mid-nineteenth century in Western societies. The oldest professional association known was founded in 1825 in the UK. Within the span of two generations the main professional associations had emerged, and, at least in the UK and the USA, they emerged within a period of about 50 years (Larson 1979).
Professional associations developed with the rise of industrial capitalism, often in a spontaneous and informal way (e.g., in the form of dining clubs), in response to the deeply felt need by professionals for discussion (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933). In the expenditure markets, professional sectors sought to improve their position in the emergent stratification system (Larson 1979). As Chapoulie (1973) observes, the evolution of the social division of labor in professional groups led to the creation of new associations by professions that had become more specialized and required a distinct education. At the same time, more highly qualified professions allowed other occupations within the same field to perform less qualified or complex tasks.
The Agricultural and the Industrial Revolution brought demographic and urban structural changes: professional work became a full-time occupation, and the number of professionals increased. In the ideal-typical passage from community-oriented to market-oriented society (Larson 1979), the growth of a middle-class clientele was an important factor for the development of professions and their associations.
Key Issues
Regulation
Professional regulation varies according to the national political system. There are three main ideal types of regulation systems: (a) independent self-regulation, which is common in the continent of Europe where professional associations have the monopoly of regulation; (b) state-sanctioned self-regulation, which can be found more often in the USA and the UK, and can be considered a consequence of the collapse of traditional independent self-regulation; and (c) state-administered regulation, which is mostly restricted to the bureaucratic control of professions, such as when the state grants a licence for professional practice (Moran and Wood 1993).
Empirical studies have neglected the role of professional bodies in regulation. In existing studies professional associations are typically portrayed as important regulatory mechanisms as they legitimate and regulate professionals’ behaviors. Prevailing accounts focus upon the essentially conservative role of professional associations, such as the control of education and admission to the profession, and the monitoring and disciplining of behavior. However at moments of institutional change, professional associations can take on a reformist role through the legitimation of change (Greenwood et al. 2002).
The increasing awareness of consumer rights and the consequent growth in litigation are contributing to the diminishing of professional control by professionals, as witnessed in the medical profession (Moran and Wood 1993). Autonomy and self-regulation are also being challenged by the increasing number of professionals in organizations (Moran and Wood 1993) and by the increase in international administrative authority (Evetts 1995).
As a result, new forms of monitoring are arising, such as the monitoring of continuing education, auditing, or acquitting specialist registers with substantial admission requirements. As Evetts (1995) argues, these aspects can no longer be referred to as “self-regulation”; the term “acquired regulation” more appropriately describes the necessary balance of responsibilities between professionals and states. Moreover, it can incorporate international as well as state forms of authority and regulatory institutions.
In this sense, Krause (1996) maintains that since the 1980s some established professions have started to lose their “guild power.” According to this author, guild power (a concept that is equally applicable to modern occupations as to medieval ones) includes control over the association, the workplace, the market, and the relation to the state. Guild power is increasingly being replaced by the power of capitalists or the state (or both) to control the nature and quality of the professional association.
Disciplinary Power
Professional associations have at their disposal a disciplinary power for professional behavior based on their ethical code. In professional associations where membership is compulsory, the strongest sanction leads to the expulsion of members and prohibition of practice thereafter (Chapoulie 1973).
But, as some authors demonstrate, in reality professional associations have limited disciplinary activity (Moran and Wood 1993). It is easier to select, govern, and control admission to an occupation than to keep performance under surveillance (Moore 1976). Moreover, the collective assertion of autonomy bears a dubious relation to an individual’s autonomy.
Elites and Democracy
Professional associations face a political structure problem common to other associations: the tension between democracy and oligarchy. Like other associations, professional associations are democratic in form and oligarchic in operation (Moore 1976). For some authors, professional associations provide a significant case to test Robert Michels’ oligarchy law as they have characteristics that mitigate the tendency toward oligarchy, such as leadership tenure and elite pluralism.
An important part of the literature about democracy in professional associations concerns leadership. These accounts compare the characteristics of the members of the profession with those of the leadership of the professional association.
A professional association board that is non-inclusive and non-compositionally representative may have positive benefits for the functioning of the association due to the increased probability of homogeneity of opinions and the pursuit of long-term strategies. However, unrepresentative elites may limit the effectiveness of the association’s actions, particularly when the effectiveness depends on the support of representative bodies and regional resources (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933). An unrepresentative elite may also alienate segments of the membership and turn resources away from the general good of either the profession or the public toward the interest of small and unrepresentative segments of professionals.
Dominance by a single homogeneous elite can be avoided by elite pluralism. However such an organizational structure, even with open and competitive elections, would not necessarily guarantee the emergence of democracy (Halliday 1987). In such a case leadership may be reluctant to grant decision-making autonomy to constituent units of the organization in order to avoid conflicts among committees, which would give a public image of lack of consensus within the association. This presents a paradox in the government of professional associations: as the association becomes more representative and inclusive in its composition, there will be a strain toward less democracy in its governance. This is how inclusiveness may bring not more but less democracy.
The critical challenge for a democratic management of a professional association lies in the skill with which it can obtain benefits from size and heterogeneity through processes that neutralize internal conflict, and create at least an appearance of professional consensus on issues of major importance to the profession or its current elite (Halliday 1987).
Knowledge Diffusion and Innovation
Professional associations play an important role in the innovation process. On the one hand, they influence the innovation process directly by disseminating a particular body of knowledge via their members; and, on the other hand, they indirectly encourage innovation diffusion through the establishment of weak ties that help foster a climate of trust among members from different organizations. This is particularly important for small, decentralized firms that may not have the knowledge and resources needed to develop innovation on their own (Swan 1995).
One of the functions of professional associations is to bring together in committees, panels, task forces, and study groups, people who, based on their background characteristics, might not otherwise be attracted to one another. As Galaskiewicz (1985) explains, the particular resource that professional associations control is specialized knowledge, and it has been widely assumed that informal networks among professionals are the means whereby information is filtered throughout the professional community. Professional associations have been able to mitigate the effect of uncertainty, essentially by eliminating status as an explanatory factor of proximity in the network. Membership in a professional association constitutes a big advantage for semiprofessionals, for it increases their chance of establishing network contact with full-time professionals and breaks down an important set of barriers.
Professional associations have the potential to act as technological gatekeepers. In fact they can have a profound influence in promoting particular visions of innovative solutions both within and across societies. Although little research has focused on professional associations as agents in the diffusion of technological innovation, the associations see the dissemination of knowledge among practitioners as a crucial aspect of their role. Nonetheless, the enactment of this role is limited by the extent to which there is active involvement in these networks by practitioners in the industry (Swan 1995).
International Perspectives
There are studies comparing professions in different countries (Krause 1996; Moran and Wood 1993), but there is no research comparing specific professional associations across countries.
Most of the literature on professions in the English language identifies a dominant model of professional associations, such as medicine or law, which is based on a narrow definition of profession, i.e., the “established professions” (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933; Wilensky 1964). According to this model, professional associations are voluntary associations.
Other literature conveys that, in Western societies, there are at least two ideal types of professional associations: the Anglo-American (the UK and the USA) and the continental European (France, Germany, Portugal, etc.). The main difference between them lies in the regulatory role of the state. In the continental European model, unlike in the Anglo-American one, the state plays a crucial knowledge control function, because it is a centralized state (Krause 1996). In this case, professional associations usually take on a semi-public status, and membership is compulsory. They may be called “professional orders,” as in France and Portugal.
In any case, organization functioning and action can be quite different from one professional association to another in the same country. These differences are due to differences in the professional institutionalization process, but they may also depend on the prestige/status of the profession, and the proximity between the profession and the political power (Gosnell and Schmidt 1935). New occupations and old professions tend to generate different professional associations, although older associations act as models for the new ones.
Future Directions
Professionalization of Semi-professions
The development of a knowledge society and valuation of professionalism will continue to push some occupations toward a professional status. “Semi-professions,” “less established,” or “emerging professions” (Alexander 1980) are less lucrative and demand fewer qualifications than medicine or law, but they may be of more importance in the future. In addition, the increase in professionals has been stressed by several authors (Freidson 1994; Putnam 2000) since Durkheim (1973) underlined the growth in labor division.
According to Putnam (2000), professional associations are an exception to a general trend of registering declines in membership around the turn of the century, at least in the USA. Membership of professional associations tends to increase because the number of professionals grows and has also been bolstered by the engagement of women in the public sphere. Nevertheless, membership behaviors may still vary according to the nature of the professional association, the profession, and country.
International Regulation
As Evetts (1995) explains, the number of international professional associations, inter-professional associations, and groups of specialists made up of representatives from national professional bodies is growing, as is their influence on the reregulation processes for service providers.
In Europe, in particular, changes to certification and accreditation systems are being based on international professional associations’ proposals and agreements. Europe seeks the harmonization of its professional services, and in order to maintain their influence in this process, national professional associations are increasing their legitimacy in international bodies. The inability of European institutions to attend to detail and to do so quickly is also contributing to the strengthening of international professional associations. At the same time, international professional associations are considered to have more legitimacy and authority to standardize working practices. Despite wielding power that is only consultative, international professional associations may constitute new arenas for the self-regulation of professions because they are already underpinned by a code of professional conduct (Evetts 1995).
Global Professional Firms
In the near future, international professional associations may be challenged to cope with global professional firms. Firms of lawyers, accountants, engineers, and others operating at an international level are populated by professionals from different contexts, thus these firms are organizations of important space complexity as conveyed by Faulconbridge and Muzio (2012). The capacity of these firms to surpass national borders cannot be disassociated from the consequent expansion beyond the scope of national regulatory bodies. Hence, professionals will become less likely to participate in activities promoted by national professional associations (Greenwood et al. 2002) because they consider such activities as impractical (Rogers et al. 2017). Global professional firms continue to employ professionals in national markets but lead them to adopt standards of professional practice based on a combination of professionalism and managerialism, the global organizational and/or commercialized professionalism (Faulconbridge and Muzio 2012). Globalization therefore represents one of the major forces today, raising uncertainties around professional regulation and challenging the traditional self-regulating bodies.
New Public Management
Developed in the USA and the UK in the 1980s, New Public Management has become a worldwide trend in accordance with a neoliberal ideology and supranational governance, characterized as a paradigm that emphasizes efficiency, competitiveness, and a focus on outputs, privileging entrepreneurship and market orientation (Andrews and Van de Walle 2013). This paradigm tends to interrelate with the public sector and the privatization of certain domains such as education and healthcare (Fitzgerald 2016), raising tensions between professionals and managers regarding professional autonomy and the reduction of costs. Some professionals tend to resist these reforms as they establish an improvement in quality through managerial power rather than professional power (Currie and Croft 2015). The organizational principles, structured around efficiency and the consumer, may condition and jeopardize professional decision-making autonomy. Therefore, as Noordegraaf (2011) demonstrates, the impact of New Public Management on professionals may involve demands for new behaviors from professional associations.
Political Influence
The political influence of professional associations, namely their formal and informal lobbying role, seems to be an important issue since these organizations can become more influential than nation-state governments. Crises of governability may lead the state to delegate some of its functions to empowered professions. As a result professional associations are often represented on public councils, taking advantage of a special relation to the state. However, in order to exercise influence, professions need to have expert authority, a “knowledge mandate” (legitimacy, substance, efficacy, etc.) and “political mobilization” capacity (being able to speak on behalf of the corporate). These attributes vary with professions (Halliday 1987).
As Halliday (1987) explains, most, but not all, professions need to be organized in associations in order to be able to exert influence. In fact, it is their representativeness that gives professional associations’ political authority. In order to attain representativeness, associations need to be able to mobilize and draw coalitions. This need leaves associations, with few exceptions, with a dilemma: the more representative they are, the less able they are to mobilize effectively. Moreover, since professions have different epistemological characteristics, these conditions are not assured in the same way. Finally, influence will also be diverse according to different levels of government.
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