Nonzero-Sum Differential Games

  • Tamer Başar
  • Alain Haurie
  • Georges Zaccour
Reference work entry


This chapter provides an overview of the theory of nonzero-sum differential games, describing the general framework for their formulation, the importance of information structures, and noncooperative solution concepts. Several special structures of such games are identified, which lead to closed-form solutions.


Closed-loop information structure Information structures Linear-quadratic games Nash equilibrium Noncooperative differential games Non-Markovian equilibrium Open-loop information structure State-feedback information structure Stackelberg equilibrium 


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© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Coordinated Science Laboratory and Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUrbanaUSA
  2. 2.ORDECSYS and University of GenevaGenevaSwitzerland
  3. 3.GERAD-HEC Montréal PQMontrealCanada
  4. 4.Department of Decision SciencesGERAD, HEC MontréalMontrealCanada

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