Resource Economics

  • Ngo Van LongEmail author
Reference work entry


This chapter provides a selective survey of dynamic game models of exploitation of natural resources. It covers both renewable resources and exhaustible resources. In relation to earlier surveys (Long, A survey of dynamic games in economics, World Scientific, Singapore, 2010; Long, Dyn Games Appl 1(1):115–148, 2011), the present work includes many references to new developments that appeared after January 2011 and additional suggestions for future research. Moreover, there is a greater emphasis on intuitive explanation.


Exhaustible resources Renewable resources Overexploitation Market structure Dynamic games 


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.McGill UniversityMontrealCanada

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