Red Tape and Bureaucracy

  • Dyah MutiarinEmail author
  • Achmad Nurmandi
  • Yasmira Moner
Living reference work entry



Leveling bureaucratic inertia occurs at the individual, group, organization, and interorganizational level. In this leveling bureaucratic inertia, organizations perpetuate the establishment of the path dependence rules and procedures, regardless of whether they are counterproductive or potentially specifically inverse built-up hierarchical objectives. In all these levels, bureaucratic inertia occurs when bureaucracy resistance to change, wherein individuals have no willingness to learn and the ability to make any organizational improvement. History, culture, and tradition are among the factors, which influenced bureaucratic inertia not only at the individual level, but also at the level of organizational networks. Bureaucratic inertia causes high costs, dependency in power, and uncertainty, which ultimately leads to a fragmented bureaucracy.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Government Affairs and Administration DepartmentJusuf Kalla School of Government, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, BantulYogyakartaIndonesia
  2. 2.Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta and MSU-Iligan Institute of TechnologyIliganPhilippines