Definition
“Costly signaling theory” proposes that animals (including humans) may send honest signals about desirable personal characteristics and access to resources through costly biological displays, altruism, or other behaviors that would be hard to fake.
Introduction
The existence of altruism was something of an obstacle for early evolutionary theorists, since an organism that engaged in behavior that came at a great personal cost and seemed to solely benefit other individuals appeared difficult for natural selection to explain. It was not until the introduction of the concept of inclusive fitness, also known as kin selection, by Hamilton in 1964 that evolutionists had a satisfactory theoretical framework for discussing altruism. The concept of kin selection, however, could not account for the many altruistic acts performed for individuals who are not genetic kin. An additional form of altruism, reciprocal altruism...
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
References
Barclay, P., & Willer, R. (2007). Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B, 274, 749–753.
Bereczkei, T., Birkas, B., & Kerekes, Z. (2010). Altruism toward strangers in need: Costly signaling in an industrial society. Evolution and Human Behavior, 31, 95–103.
Bliege Bird, R. B., & Smith, E. A. (2005). Signaling theory, strategic interaction, and symbolic capital. Current Anthropology, 46, 221–248.
Bloch, F., Rao, V., & Desai, S. (2004). Wedding celebrations as conspicuous consumption: Signaling social status in rural India. The Journal of Human Resources, 39, 675–695.
Boone, J. L. (1998). The evolution of magnanimity: When is it better to give than to receive? Human Nature, 9, 1–21.
Bowles, S., & Gintis, S. (2011). A cooperative species: Human reciprocity and its evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Farrelly, D., Lazarus, J., & Roberts, G. (2007). Altruists attract. Evolutionary Psychology, 5, 313–329.
Farthing, G. W. (2005). Attitudes toward heroic and nonheroic physical risk takers as mates and as friends. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 171–185.
Fessler, D. M. T., Tiokhin, L. B., Holbrook, C., Gervais, M. M., & Snyder, J. K. (2014). Foundations of the Crazy Bastard Hypothesis: Nonviolent physical risk-taking enhances conceptualized formidability. Evolution and Human Behavior, 35, 26–33.
Grafen, A. (1990). Biological signals as handicaps. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 144, 517–546.
Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., Sundie, J. M., Cialdini, R. B., Miller, G. F., & Kenrick, D. T. (2007). Blatant benevolence and conspicuous consumption. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 85–102.
Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., & Van den Bergh, B. (2010). Going green to be seen: Status, reputation, and conspicuous consumption. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98, 392–404.
Gurven, M., Allen-Arave, W., Hill, K., & Hurtado, M. (2000). It’s a wonderful life: Signaling generosity among the Ache of Paraguay. Evolution and Human Behavior, 21, 263–282.
Haley, K. J., & Fessler, D. M. T. (2005). Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 257–270.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behavior, I, II. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 1–52.
Hawkes, K. (1991). Showing off: Tests of another hypothesis about men’s foraging goals. Ethology and Sociobiology, 11, 29–54.
Hennighausen, C., Hudders, L., Lange, B. P., & Fink, H. (2016). What if the rival drives a Porsche? Luxury car spending as a costly signal in male intrasexual competition. Evolutionary Psychology, 14, 1–13.
Henrich, J. (2009). The evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion: Credibility enhancing displays and their implications for cultural evolution. Evolution and Human Behavior, 30, 244–260.
Higham, J. P. (2014). How does honest costly signaling work? Behavioral Ecology, 25, 8–11.
Hill, K., & Hurtado, A. M. (1996). The ecology and demography of a foraging people. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Iredale, W., Van Vugt, M., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2008). Showing off in humans: Male generosity as a mating signal. Evolutionary Psychology, 6, 386–392.
Iredale, W., and Van Vugt, M. (2009). The peacock’s tail of altruism. The Psychologist, 22, 938–941.
Kelly, S., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2001). Who dares, wins. Heroism versus altruism in women’s mate choice. Human Nature, 12, 89–105.
Kniffin, K. M., & Sugiyama, M. C. (2018). Toward a natural history of team sports. Human Nature, 29, 211–218.
Lyons, M. (2005). Who are the heroes? Characteristics of people who rescue others. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology, 3, 239–248.
McAndrew, F. T. (2002). New evolutionary perspectives on altruism: Multilevel-selection and costly-signaling theories. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 79–82.
McAndrew, F. T. (2018, Jan 9). Why men will always be more disgusting than women. Psychology Today Magazine (Blog).
McAndrew, F. T., & Perilloux, C. (2012). Is self-sacrificial competitive altruism primarily a male activity? Evolutionary Psychology, 10, 50–65.
Mesquida, C. G., & Wiener, N. I. (1996). Human collective aggression: A behavioral ecology perspective. Ethology and Sociobiology, 17, 247–262.
Nelissen, R. M. A., & Meijers, M. H. C. (2011). Social benefits of luxury brands as costly signals of wealth and status. Evolution and Human Behavior, 32, 343–355.
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature, 437, 1291–1298.
Palmer, C. T., & Tilley, C. F. (1995). Sexual access to females as a motivation for joining gangs: An evolutionary approach. The Journal of Sex Research, 32, 213–217.
Roberts, G. (1998). Competitive altruism: from reciprocity to the handicap principle. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B, 265, 427–431.
Rusch, H., Leunissen, J. M., & van Vugt, M. (2015). Historical and experimental evidence of sexual selection for war heroism. Evolution and Human Behavior, 36, 367–373.
Saad, G. (2007). The evolutionary bases of consumption. Mahwah: Erlbaum.
Saad, G. (2011). The consuming instinct. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
Smith, E. A. (2004). Why do good hunters have higher reproductive success? Human Nature, 15, 343–364.
Smith, E. A., & Bird, R. L. B. (2000). Turtle hunting and tombstone opening: Public generosity as costly signaling. Evolution and Human Behavior, 21, 245–261.
Soler, M. (2012). Costly signaling, ritual and cooperation: Evidence from an Afro-Brazilian religion. Evolution and Human Behavior, 33, 3346–3356.
Sosis, R. (2000). Costly signaling and torch fishing on Ifaluk Atoll. Evolution and Human Behavior, 21, 233–244.
Sosis, R., & Bressler, E. R. (2003). Cooperation and commune longevity: A test of the costly signaling theory of religion. Cross-Cultural Research, 37, 211–239.
Sundie, J. M., Kenrick, D. T., Grikevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., Vohs, K. D., & Beal, D. J. (2011). Peacocks, Porsches, and Thorstein Veblen: Conspicuous consumption as a sexual signaling system. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 664–680.
Sylwester, K., & Pawlowski, B. (2011). Daring to be darling: Attractiveness of risk takers as partners in long- and short-term sexual relationships. Sex Roles, 64, 695–706.
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35–57.
Van Vugt, M., & Hardy, C. L. (2010). Cooperation for reputation: Wasteful contributions as costly signals in public goods. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 13, 101–111.
Wang, Y., & Griskevicius, V. (2014). Conspicuous consumption, relationships, and rivals: Women’s luxury products as signals to other women. Journal of Consumer Research, 40, 834–854.
Wiessner, P. (2002). Hunting, healing, and hxaro exchange: A long-term perspective on !Kung (Ju/’hoansi) large-game hunting. Evolution and Human Behavior, 23, 407–436.
Willer, R. (2009). Groups reward individual sacrifice: The status solution to the collective action problem. American Sociological Review, 74, 23–43.
Wilson, D. S. (2002). Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, religion, and the nature of society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wilson, M. I., & Daly, M. (1985). Competitiveness, risk-taking, and violence: The young male syndrome. Ethology and Sociobiology, 6, 59–73.
Zahavi, A. (1975). Mate selection: A selection for handicap. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 53, 205–214.
Zahavi, A. (1977). Reliability in communication systems and the evolution of altruism. In B. Stonehouse & C. M. Perrins (Eds.), Evolutionary ecology (pp. 253–259). London: Macmillan Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Section Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this entry
Cite this entry
McAndrew, F.T. (2019). Costly Signaling Theory. In: Shackelford, T., Weekes-Shackelford, V. (eds) Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3483-1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3483-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-16999-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-16999-6
eBook Packages: Springer Reference Behavioral Science and PsychologyReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences