Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics pp 1–9Cite as

Public Choice: The Virginia School

  • Living reference work entry
  • First Online:

Abstract

Public Choice, broadly defined, is the economic analysis of nonmarket decision-making. My primary focus in this chapter will be on the central importance of the “Virginia School” of Public Choice, specifically in two aspects. First, Public Choice was central to countering the presumption of market failure among economists, beginning in the 1950s and 1960s. Second, yet less emphasized, is the role in which Public Choice played in analyzing the economics of anarchy, beginning in the 1970s. Although seemingly disconnected, both aspects of the Virginia School are linked by the fundamental question of political economy: Under what institutional conditions can social order emerge unintendedly from the self-interest of individuals? Therefore, in both respects, the Virginia School has been central to the rearticulation of 19th political economy during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

References

  • Benson BL (1989) The spontaneous evolution of Commerical law. South Econ J 55(3):644–661

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benson BL (1990) The Enterprise of law: justice without the state. Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, San Francisco

    Google Scholar 

  • Boettke PJ (2012) Living economics: yesterday, today, and tomorrow. The Independent Institute, Oakland

    Google Scholar 

  • Boettke PJ, Lesson PT (2015) Introduction. In: Boettke PJ, Leeson PT (eds) The international library of critical writings in economics 304: the economic role of the state. Edward Elgar, Northampton

    Google Scholar 

  • Boettke PJ, Marciano A (2015) The past, present, and future of Virginia political economy. Public Choice 163(1–2):53–65

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM (1949) The pure theory of government finance: a suggested approach. J Polit Econ 57(6):496–505

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM 1958 (1999) The collected works of James M. Buchanan Vol. 2, Public principles of public debt: a defense and restatement. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM (1964) What should economists do? South Econ J 30(3):213–222

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM 1969 (1999). The collected works of James M. Buchanan Vol. 6, Cost and choice: an inquiry in economic theory. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM 1979 (1999) Politics without romance: a sketch of positive public choice theory and its normative implications. In: The collected works of James M. Buchanan Vol. 1, The logical foundations of constitutional liberty. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM 1983 (2000) The achievement and the limits of public choice in diagnosing government failure and in offering bases for constructive reform. In: The collected works of James M. Buchanan volume 13: politics as public choice. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan J 1996 (2001) Adam Smith as inspiration. In: The collected works of James M. Buchanan volume 19: ideas, persons, and events. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM (2005) Reflections after three decades. In: Stringham E (ed) Anarchy, state and public choice. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM (2015) Notes on Hayek – Miami, 15 February 1979. Rev Austrian Econ 28(3):257–260

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM, Thirby GF (1981) L.S.E. Essays on cost. New York University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Bush W 1972 (2005) Individual welfare in anarchy. In: Stringham E (ed) Anarchy, state and public choice. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase RH (1959) The Federal Communications Commission. J Law Econ 2:1–40

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coyne CJ (2008) After war: the political economy of exporting democracy. Stanford University Press, Stanford

    Google Scholar 

  • Demsetz H (1969) Information and efficiency: another viewpoint. J Law Econ 12(1):1–22

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leeson PT (2007) Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse. J Comp Econ 35(4):689–710

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Menger C 1883 (1985) Investigations into the method of the social sciences. New York University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell WC (1988) Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: twenty-five years of public choice and political science. Public Choice 56(2):101–119

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mueller DC (1976) Public choice: a survey. J Econ Lit 14(2):395–433

    Google Scholar 

  • Powell B, Stringham EP (2009) Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey. Public Choice 140(3–4):503–538

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson PA (1948) Economics. McGraw-Hill, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Simmons RT (2011) Beyond politics: the roots of government failure. The Independent Institute, Oakland

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock G (ed) (1972) Explorations in the theory of anarchy. Center for the Study of Public Choice, Blacksburg

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock G (ed) (1974) Further explorations in the theory of anarchy. University Publications, Blacksburg

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagner RE (2012) Deficits, debt, and democracy: wrestling with tragedy on the fiscal commons. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wagner RE (2017) James M. Buchanan and liberal political economy: a rational reconstruction. Lexington, Lanham

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Political Theory Project, Department of Political Science, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA

    Rosolino A. Candela

Authors
  1. Rosolino A. Candela
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rosolino A. Candela .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Dept DiGSPES, Univ del Piemonte Orientale Dept DiGSPES, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer Science+Business Media LLC

About this entry

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this entry

Candela, R.A. (2018). Public Choice: The Virginia School. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_390-1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_390-1

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation