Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Bondholder’s Trustee

  • Flavio BazzanaEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_78

Abstract

The bondholder’s trustee is an agent that will manage the bond contract between the issuer and the investors. The main reason for the existence of the bondholder’s trustee is to reduce the general conflict of interests between debtholders and shareholders. Another important role of the bondholder’s trustee is in the case of default, because reducing the expected costs of financial distress may decrease potential losses incurred by the bondholders. However, only recently the inadequacy of the current bondholder’s trustee in different legal cultures has been criticised and, in the German case, also amended.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics and ManagementUniversity of TrentoTrentoItaly