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Corporate Criminal Liability

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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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Abstract

This entry reviews the literature on corporate criminal liability. It first describes the different forms of corporate liability and then discusses the optimal structure of corporate sanctions to deter crimes. The distinction between civil and criminal corporate liability is addressed, and a brief discussion of the corporate criminal enforcement in the United States and Europe is presented.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Law, University of Urbino, Urbino, Italy

    Paolo Polidori & Désirée Teobaldelli

Authors
  1. Paolo Polidori
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  2. Désirée Teobaldelli
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Désirée Teobaldelli .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. MRE and University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Faculté d’Economie, Université de Montpellier and LAMETA-UMR CNRS, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  3. DiGSPES, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

  4. IEL, Torino, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Polidori, P., Teobaldelli, D. (2019). Corporate Criminal Liability. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_701

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