Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Keeping Promises and Contracts

  • Sergio MittlaenderEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_696

Abstract

There are reasons for individuals to keep contractual promises beyond legal remedies and reputational concerns. This entry reviews the leading explanations of promise-keeping behavior as well as recent evidence for the latter as collected in laboratory experiments. In the end, it discusses avenues for future research and recent applications of the results collected so far for the design of contracts and their legal enforcement.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social PolicyMunichGermany