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Exploring the Deterrent Impact of Financial Supervisory Liability

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Abstract

This entry provides a law and economics analysis of financial supervisory liability. It discusses the deterrent impact of financial supervisory liability by using existing law and economics theory and empirical evidence.

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Correspondence to Robert J. Dijkstra .

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Dijkstra, R.J. (2019). Exploring the Deterrent Impact of Financial Supervisory Liability. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_677

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