Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

De Jure/De Facto Institutions

  • Jacek LewkowiczEmail author
  • Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_661

Abstract

Recent works in Law and Economics distinguish between the so-called de jure and de facto institutions. We define these two types of institutions, as well as indicate their place in the broad institutional system, in particular relative to the formal/informal and external/internal distinctions applied in (new) institutional economics. We also mention the possible interrelationships between de facto and de jure institutions, linking them to economic outcomes, and provide examples of de jure/de facto analyses in Law and Economics. Finally, we reflect on controversies and lacunas in the literature and present an outlook for future research.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jacek Lewkowicz
    • 1
    Email author
  • Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Economic SciencesUniversity of WarsawWarsawPoland