Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Type-I and Type-II Errors

  • Matteo RizzolliEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_66

Abstract

Adjudicative procedures meant at establishing truth about facts on defendants’ behavior are naturally prone to errors: defendants can be found guilty/liable when they truly were not (type-I errors) or they can be acquitted when they should have been convicted (type-II errors). These errors alter the incentives of defendants to comply with norms. We review the literature with a particular focus on type-I errors.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LUMSA UniversityRomeItaly