Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Independent Regulatory Authorities

  • Régis LanneauEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_647

Abstract

Independent regulatory agencies are now considered to be the sign of modern economic regulatory systems. They proliferated since the 1980s, and it is believed that they are enhancing the efficiency of regulation. In this entry, I will use law and economics to develop some rationale to explain their diffusion and emergence.

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Law School, CRDPUniversité de Paris NanterreNanterreFrance